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When analysing conflicts from either academic or policy perspectives, conflict parties 
are often treated as monolithic ‘black boxes’. Analysis tends to be centred on relations 
between principal parties and third party actors both in phases of conflict and of peace. In 
turn, attention is often focussed on the day to day evolution of relations between conflict 
parties, at the expense of the underlying long-term drivers of conflict and peace, which 
often lie within conflict parties themselves. This is particularly true in the Middle East, 
where the succession of crises in the region often leaves analysts and policy-makers little 
time to reflect upon the structural root drivers of conflict. 
Stemming from this premise, this report draws out some of the main structural, interest-
based and ideational domestic drivers within three conflict parties in the Middle East: 
Israel, Palestine and Lebanon. On the basis of this analysis, this report examines the 
extent and manner in which these domestic drivers have impinged upon the ensuing 
inter-connected conflict hubs in the region; namely the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians, between Israel and Lebanon and Syria, and between Syria and Lebanon. This 
report also discusses how external parties and most importantly EU actors have affected 
these conflicts by operating – deliberately or not – on their respective domestic drivers. 
In turn, we conclude by drawing out alternative policy approaches that could aid the EU 
pursue its oft-quoted objective to contribute and promote peace in the region.
In the case of Israel, two long-term ideational goals have shaped the conduct of Israeli 
policy, impinging upon Israel’s relations first and foremost with the Palestinians as 
well as with Lebanon and Syria. Daniela Pioppi recounts how the domestic goals of 
territorial expansion and demographic control and the inherent tension between them 
have played a key role in shaping the historical evolution of Israel’s conflicts in all their 
successive stages, and most critically before, during and after the Oslo process. Yet in 
order to understand the significance of these national goals, appreciate their changing 
conceptualizations, and grasp their permanency despite their seemingly contradictory 
nature, the structural features characterizing Israel’s domestic politics and polity must 
be scrutinized. This chapter reveals how far from being a ‘one-man show’, Israel’s policy 
has been determined by a complex balance between different state institutions, their 
underlying interests, as well as the demographic make-up of the Israeli polity. Hence, 
while charismatic politicians of either ‘hawkish’ or ‘doveish’ inclinations may partially 
redirect and re-package policy, underlying structural drivers often remain unchanged 
and have largely explained the long-term continuity of Israeli policy. Only once these 
drivers are fully grasped, it is possible to comprehend the impact of external parties on 
the conflict and the reasons why third parties have failed to meaningfully alter long-term 
conflict dynamics in the region.  
In Palestine, Nathalie Tocci focuses on structural and ideational factors which have shaped 
the Palestinians’ conduct in the conflict with Israel. Structural factors such as the duality 
between the PA and the PLO, the decline of the secular Fateh movement, the exclusion 
of the Islamist factions from the PLO (and until recently the PA), and the rise in popular 
appeal of Hamas have all had specific effects on the development of the conflict with 
Israel. Interests and ideologies within both the secular and the Islamist camps, as well 
as in the loosely defined ‘civil society’ sector in the Occupied Territories have also had 
discernible and often negative effects on the conflict. Yet more so than in other principal 
parties, the conflict itself has had a key impact on internal Palestinian drivers, giving rise 
to tangled circular causal relationship between the inside and the outside. This chapter 
concludes by analysing the impact of EU policies towards Palestine, explaining how more 
often than not they have exacerbated the domestic Palestinian drivers of the conflict by 
inducing differentiated empowerment between different sets of domestic actors and their 
respective political platforms. 
Karam Karam examines the case of Lebanon, analysing the sectarian political structures 
in the country and their ensuing modus operandi and inbuilt incentives. He explains how 
these on the one hand have impinged upon relations with both Israel and Syria, and on the 
other hand have stalled the process of domestic reform in Lebanon itself. Yet as in the case 
of Palestine, one cannot neglect the effect that relations with Israel and Syria have had 
on domestic politics in Lebanon, exacerbating dynamics of conflict and confessionalism 
rather contributing to transcend these. The author in particular takes the cases of the 
Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the Israeli war in Summer 2006 to examine how relations 
with these two neighbours have impinged upon domestic dynamics in Lebanon. Finally this 
chapter turns to third party involvement, principally in the form of UN resolution 1559 in 
2004, arguing that far from promoting a deconfessionalization of politics in Lebanon, third 
parties have tended to either consolidate confessional structures, or risk exacerbating 
internal polarization and inducing renewed sectarian conflict in the country.
Executive
Summary
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Both the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) have identified peace-making as one of their key priorities.1 Indeed the South 
and Southeast Mediterranean is rife with old and new conflicts, whose evolution and 
perpetuation generate dangerous spill-over effects both within the region and into Europe. 
In particular the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israel-Syria-Lebanon conflicts are amongst the 
most salient conflict hubs in the region. 
The events of the summer of 2006 forcefully remind us of this fact. The reoccupation and 
destruction of the Gaza Strip, coupled with and in the shadow of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon stand out as a tragic reminder of the saliency and inter-connectedness of these 
two conflict hubs. 
However, while policy makers and analysts tend to focus on the day-to-day analysis of 
unfolding events, less attention is paid to the long-term structural conflict dynamics, thus 
dangerously neglecting the root-causes of conflict. 
This report aims at partially filling this gap by focusing on long-term structural internal 
dynamics within three conflict parties: Israel, Palestine and Lebanon. The major contention 
advanced and explored in this report is that domestic dynamics represent principal factors 
determining the evolution of relations between conflict parties and thus of the conflicts 
themselves, namely Israel-Palestine, Israel-Lebanon/Syria and Lebanon-Syria. This is not 
to deny an inverse causal relationship, whereby conflicts impinge critically upon domestic 
dynamics, giving rise to an inevitable circularity in the causal relationship. It is precisely for 
this reason that, while retaining a focus on domestic determinants, this report will also delve 
into the inverse causal relationship. Furthermore, the premise underlying this report is also 
that while external factors are often critical for the evolution of conflicts, their importance is 
precisely given by the manner in which they interact with internal dynamics. We will therefore 
also assess the impact of external policies on the three conflict parties and their domestic 
drivers, devoting special attention to the policies of the EU. In turn, a final part of the report 
is devoted to policy recommendations aimed at influencing these domestic dynamics, which 
can lead to a more effective EU peace-making strategy in the region.
Research outline
This report is organized in three principal chapters, analysing domestic dynamics in Israel, 
Palestine and Lebanon, their impact on the resulting conflicts and the external influence on 
those domestic dynamics. Each chapter provides both a mapping of the domestic political 
scene as well as an analysis of its changing dynamics over time. In explaining the drivers 
of domestic change and their ensuing impact on the conflict we have attempted to provide 
long-term factors underpinning domestic change or lack thereof over time. 
In the case of Israel, Daniela Pioppi explains how two relatively stable domestic drivers in 
Israeli politics, namely the drive for territorial expansion and that for demographic control 
have played a key role in explaining the different stages of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
both in the Oslo and post-Oslo contexts. She then explains how external involvement has 
by and large accepted Israeli policy and action, opting not to influence Israel’s underlying 
domestic drivers. 
Nathalie Tocci focuses on the case of Palestine. She focuses on structural domestic factors 
such as the PA-PLO duality, the decline of Fateh and the exclusion of the Islamist factions, 
as well as on underlying Palestinian interests and ideas, and the way these have influenced 
the conflict with Israel. She then turns to the inverse causal relationship, assessing the 
impact of the conflict on those key domestic drivers. Finally, she concludes by analysing the 
impact of external policies of conditionality towards Palestine, which have largely aimed to 
empower one set of domestic actors over another.
Karam Karam analyses the case of Lebanon tackling first the domestic confessional political 
structures and then the impact of recent events such as the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 
and Israeli war in the summer of 2006.  Evaluating the recent international involvement in 
Lebanon since UN resolution 1559, Karam highlights the risk of internal polarisation and 
renewed sectarian conflict.
The report concludes by drawing some of the major lessons learnt from the three case 
studies and the manner in which external actors have impacted upon their internal 
dynamics. These lessons are applied to outline alternative policy approaches which the 
EU could endorse in order to have a more constructive and long-term influence on the 
structural domestic drivers fuelling these inter-connected Middle East conflicts.  
Introduction
1 Commission of the EC (2004), European Neighbour-
hood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, COM(2004) 373. 
p.3 and p.6. Online available at HTTP: http://www.
ec.europa.eu.
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The research was organised in a time span of 6 months, January-June 2006.  As the starting 
point of the research, four survey papers were commissioned to regional experts focussing 
on domestic drivers of conflict in Israel (Ilan Pappé, University of Haifa), Syria (Salam 
Kawakibi, Independent Syrian Scholar), Palestine (Yazid Sayigh, King’s College London) 
and Lebanon (Karam Karam, LCPS Beirut).2 The survey papers are in the appendix of this 
report. The research benefited also from a research trip to Israel, Palestine and Lebanon in 
May 2006, during which interviews were carried out with officials, scholars and political 
activists on internal developments and conflict dynamics.
2 Two of the above papers were published as: Y. 
Sayigh (2006), “Changing Dynamics in Palestinian 
Politics”, The International Spectator, vol. XLI, no. 2, 
pp. 69-86 and K. Karam (2006), “Post-Syria Lebanon: 
Internal and External Determinants of a Crisis”, The In-
ternational Spectator, vol. XLI, no. 2, pp. 51-68.    
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This chapter aims at analysing the Israeli domestic drivers of conflict and their evolution 
over time. The analysis focuses on two central issues in Israeli politics: (1) the policy of 
territorial expansion and (2) the so-called ‘demography’ question or the basic Zionist 
tenet to preserve Israel as a Jewish State. This choice rests on the fact that both territorial 
expansion and demography are at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian colonial conflict, which 
in turn is at the core of Israel conflict-ridden relations with its neighbours. 
As far as territorial expansion is concerned, the international community has long 
condemned the acquisition of territories by force3 and recognised the unlawfulness4 of 
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories (OTs), as well as their being one of the major 
impediments to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is testified by 
the fact that any peace proposal has, for the past two decades, always called for an end of 
military occupation and a removal of settlements as the condition for establishing cohesion 
in the Palestinian economy and society, enabling viable Palestinian governance, and, thus, 
allowing normalisation of Israel’s existence in the region. 
Notwithstanding the official international stand, the expansion of Israeli settlements has 
continued on a sustained pace since 1967, with the greatest expansion having taken place 
after Oslo and more so in the last decade. Today, Israeli settlers in the OTs are about 425.000 
of which more than 175.000 in the area of East Jerusalem.5 The appropriation of land for 
Israeli settlements, bypass road and related infrastructures, the seizure of vital resources 
such as water and, more recently, the construction of a Wall through the West Bank, have 
had a devastating effect on the fundamental rights of local Palestinian population and 
have, as of today, seriously undermined the prospects for the establishment of a viable 
Palestinian state. West Bank settlements are not small outposts that can be easily removed 
as sometimes they are portrayed nor are they built and expanded at the initiative of zealot 
individuals and minority groups, rather they are State planned full-scale cities, that include 
adjacent industrial zones and are linked to a huge road and an infrastructure network. A 
superficial look at these vast social infrastructures and to their encroachment in the land is 
enough to reveal the real weight of this issue in determining the evolution of the conflict. 
The second question at the centre of our analysis is the basic Zionist tenet of Jewish 
statehood – understood as the perceived need to maintain a permanent Jewish national 
control over institutions and governance within a territorial state. As underlined by Ilan 
Pappé in his research report for this project,6 the need to maintain a large Jewish majority 
within Israel is the thread unifying Israeli politics over time both internally, with respect to 
the Arab citizens of Israel, and externally, in the historical policy of annexation of as much 
land without people as possible and, more recently, in the ‘separation’ drive.
In this chapter we argue that the policy of territorial expansion and the ambition of 
maintaining Israel as a Jewish state - especially when pursued together - impede a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, not least because of the existence of a fast-growing Palestinian 
population of 1.3 million inside Israel (almost 20% of the population), of more than 3 million 
and a half in the OTs and of more than 2,5 millions of Palestinian refugees registered with 
UNRWA outside the OTs.7
In the following paragraphs, after a concise overview of the Israeli institutional and political 
domestic scene, we will give an account of how territorial expansion and demography have 
been dealt with in Israeli politics, starting from Oslo and the Labour decision to embrace 
‘the 2 state solution’ until the recent unilateral ‘disengagement’ plan. 
Both the policy of territorial expansion and the demography question have been constant 
in Israeli history. The reason for that is that they are embedded in the ideology, programmes 
and even the design of state institutions, including the ministries, most parties, and the 
Jewish-national-state agencies (the Jewish Agency, the World Zionist Organisation, the 
Israel Lands Authority and the Jewish National Fund). A major reconfiguration of those 
questions in Israeli politics would imply not merely a change of government or policy, but 
a much deeper reconsideration of the nature of the State and of the basis of its identity. 
Such key reconsideration has never been seriously attempted in Israel history, nor have the 
international actors involved in conflict mediation seriously pursued it. 
The Israeli domestic scene has been dominated up to 1967 by the Zionist Labour movement 
(Mapai) to such an extent that the platform and agenda of Labour could be said to be that 
of the State of Israel. The Labour movement embodied the national Zionist consensus that 
could be described in simple terms as the wish to create a democratic Jewish State over 
Part I
ISRAEL
by Daniela Pioppi
1. 
The Israeli Drivers
of Conflict:
The Unremitting 
Policies of Territorial 
Expansion
and Demography
1.1 
The Israeli
domestic scene
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most of Mandatory Palestine. Mainstream Zionism was shaped ideologically from the start 
by the idea of restoring a Jewish national land in which Jewish people from all over the 
world could create a Jewish society embracing all field of work and culture. To be truly 
Jewish in character, such a society required a permanent and overwhelming Jewish majority, 
a condition that necessitated ‘cleansing’ the land of its majority Arab population.8   
In 1950, soon after the foundation of the State of Israel, the ‘Law of Return’ granted all 
Jews the right to live in Israel as citizens of the new Jewish State. The principal factor in 
the absorption of the immigrants and the creation of a common Israeli citizenship beyond 
cultural and socio-economic differences was a strong identity-building effort based on the 
main Zionist tenets, implying also the adoption of modern Hebrew as a common language. 
This was done mainly through the institutions created by the first Jewish immigrants’ 
community and elaborated by the Israeli State, in particular the educational system, the 
Mapai-dominated army, the Mapai-dominated trade-union (Histadrut) and the political 
institutions of the new republic.
Between 1948 and 1989 Israel created the most powerful state system in the Middle East. 
As late as 1982, 50% of the GNP went to the government in taxes and because all external 
assistance and financial flows - from which the country was highly dependent - passed 
through the government’s hands and/or the various state agencies’, the state had an 
absolute dominant position, also controlling 92 % of the land through the National Land 
Authority.
Despite the cultural-ideological and socio-economic efforts to create a homogeneous and 
equal society, the task of absorbing 1.75 million migrants between 1948 and 19899 was 
overwhelming and inevitably produced profound socio-economic inequalities and cultural 
cleavages, particularly between the economically and politically dominant Ashkenazi Jews 
of European origin and the Oriental or Sephardic Jews from Asia and Africa,10 not to mention 
the second class status of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel, heirs of the Palestinians living 
in the territories annexed in 1948.11 
Domestic cleavages are reflected in the absence of a national consensus on the role that 
religion should play in the modern state of Israel. The tension between religious and 
secular influences pervades all aspects of politics and society, such as the party system, the 
educational system, the way ethnic groups are dealt with and so on. As a result Israel does 
not have a written constitution, nor it has ever defined its territorial boundaries, leaving 
open both questions of the founding nature of the State and of its territorial correlation 
with the Biblical Jewish Kingdoms (Greater Israel). 
Growing internal inequalities and ethnic fragmentation coupled with the effects of two 
Arab-Israeli wars (1967 and 1973) contributed to the erosion of the early Zionist-Labour 
consensus and to the gradual rising of the Zionist-right, more effective than the Ashkenazi-
dominated Labour in attracting marginalised Oriental Jews. 
During the first twenty years of Israel’s existence, Oriental Jews voted for the Labour Party, 
even though Labour’s ideological blend of secular-socialist Zionism conflicted sharply 
with the Oriental Jews’ cultural heritage, which tended to be more religious. With growing 
economic inequality and marginalisation, resentment of Labour’s cultural, political, and 
economic hegemony increased as it did the Zionist-right appeal.12 
Already in the pre-1948 period, to the right of the mainstream Zionist-Labour establishment 
was the Revisionist Zionist Movement, which rejected Ben Gurion’s support for the 1947 
UN partition plan of the Mandatory territory into two separate entities, calling for a more 
aggressive policy towards the Arabs and the British and claiming all of Mandatory Palestine 
and Transjordan as the promised land of Israel (Greater Israel).13
The revisionist aspirations seemed closer to achievement when after the 1967 war, Israel 
occupied the Gaza Strip and the West-Bank. In 1973, Ariel Sharon, who had just left the 
Israeli Defence Force, established a new right-wing party, the Likud, upholding the 
traditional revisionist focus on Jewish national security, preservation of the land of Greater 
Israel and rejection of Palestinian national claims. Breaking the monopoly of Labour since 
1948, the Likud came to power in 1977 with Menachem Begin, then again in the eighties 
with Yitzhak Shamir and later with Netanyahu and Sharon. 
A further element of change on the Israeli domestic scene was the increased role of the 
Israeli army (Israeli Defence Forces, IDF) in politics and society due to war making and 
ensuing territorial occupation in the late sixties and seventies. Not only, in fact, it became 
3 UN resolution 242, 22 November 1967.
4 UN resolution 465, 1 March 1980.
5 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Settlements In-
formation, Statistics, 
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/statistics.html 
(accessed June 2006).
6 See I. Pappé report in the Appendix.
7 The Palestinian refugees registered with the UNRWA 
in 2004 was 4.186.711 including the refugees inside 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (1.614.201). However 
figures could rise up to almost 6 millions if all the de-
scendants of refugees now residing anywhere in the 
world are included.
8 See I. Pappé report in the Appendix and ICG (2004), 
Identity Crisis: Israel and its Arab Citizens, Middle East 
Report No. 25, 4 March.9 The population of Israel after 
its foundation in 1948 was only 800.000 (including 
20% Arab population).
10 Oriental Jews are today about 40 % of the popula-
tion, whereas Azkenazis about 25%.
11 See I. Pappé in the Appendix. 
12 Interview with Arab-Israeli scholar, Haifa, May 2006.
13 C. Shindler (2002), The Land Beyond Promise. Israel, 
the Likud and the Zionist Dream, London: I.B. Tauris.
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normal for military officers to enter politics on retiring from service, but also the main 
business of the state grow to be the preservation of the IDF. From 1973 to 1982 nearly 
50 % of the state budget went to the IDF, thus shaping all political decisions on Israel’s 
development. The enhanced structural prevalence of the military apparatus within state 
institutions contributed to the securitisation and militarisation of Israeli society. In 1975 
the conscript service was increased to three years for men and two for women followed by 
a long period of reserve service. The army gained gradually the power to shape political 
decision-making with respect to the conflict, contributing to the prevailing ‘security’ 
discourse over civilian concerns.
Despite their divergences, both Labour and Likud could be defined as ‘traditional Zionism’, 
which is the ideological and cultural current underpinning  “the policies and plans of all 
Israeli governments since the creation of the state and […] the principal prism through 
which the political centre and the professional elites in Israel view the Israeli-Palestinian 
reality”.14
More recently new tendencies, both from right and left, have challenged this ‘traditional’ 
stream. Pappé calls them respectively neo-Zionism and post-Zionism. Right-wing neo-
Zionism is emerging through the fanatisation of religious groups in Israel, the Zionisation of 
the previously anti-Zionist ultra-orthodox Jews, the growing internal ethnic fragmentation 
(e.g. insulation of segments of the Sephardic Jewish community) and, generally speaking, 
growing economic difficulties and inequalities.
This cluster of small right-wing religious parties (mainly the Shas, but also the National 
Religious Party-National Union or the United Torah Judaism) gained influence under the 
Netanyahu and Sharon governments and aim at reconfiguring Israel as an ethno-religious 
theocracy. They are posit to gain significant ground in Israeli popular political thoughts. 
Besides religious neo-Zionism, an extremist secular right is also gaining ground as the 
recent electoral success of the Yisrael Beitenu (Israel is Our Home) party demonstrates. 
Yisrael Beitenu has a constituency among the overwhelmingly secular, largely unassimilated 
and generally hawkish Russian-speaking population.
Post-Zionists, on an opposite stance, criticise Israel’s ethno-nationalist mission from a 
liberal secular position and with an emphasis on democratic values, thus also rejecting 
what they see as the ethnocentrism of traditional Zionism. Reacting to the violence of 
the occupation, post-Zionists promote a vision of Israel as a secular democratic state 
that should serve all its citizens (Jews and non-Jews) equally. However, the post-Zionist 
movement is very small and fragile, its members are often accused of national treason and, 
as of today, very marginal to the mainstream national debate.15  
After the 1967 war and throughout the 1970s and the 1980s all Israeli governments strongly 
rejected Palestinian national aspiration. At the beginning of the nineties, however, a number 
of new international and domestic factors convinced the Israeli government to reverse their 
position and start a negotiation process with the Palestinians.
First, the breaking out of the Palestinian uprising in the OTs in 1987-88 not only increased 
the cost of Israeli occupation, but also conspicuously deteriorated Israel’s international 
image, leading to a harsh internal debate that questioned the democratic character of the 
Israeli state. 
Second, and no less important, the end of the Cold war and the 1991 war in Iraq created the 
international and regional incentives for a resolution of the Middle East four decades old 
conflict, driving the US administration to press in that direction.
However, the most relevant factor compelling Israeli decision-makers was domestic and 
‘demographic’, that is to say the fear of having to take full responsibility of the occupation 
and, in a not so distant future, annex the Palestinian population living in the OTs. As clearly 
explained by Rabin in 1995: “we had to choose between the Greater Land of Israel, which 
means a bi-national state whose populations would comprise, as of today, 4.5 million Jews 
and more than 3 millions Palestinians […] and a state in a smaller area, but which would be 
a Jewish state.”16 
It seemed thus a reasonable solution to Israeli public and decision-makers to bring back 
from exile the PLO leadership, capable of granting security in the territories, and to give the 
Palestinians the chance to organise themselves as an autonomous political entity. 
1.2
The Oslo process 
and the 2 states solution
14 I. Pappé (2003), “The square circle: The Struggle 
for Survival of Traditional Zionism”, in E. Nimni (ed.), 
The Challenge of Post-Zionism: Alternatives to the 
Israeli Fundamentalist Politics, London: Zed Books, 
p. 46 and 54. 
15 Interview with post-Zionist scholar, Haifa, May 2006. 
16 The Jerusalem Post, International ed., 14 October 
1995, quoted by V. Tilley (2005), The One-State solu-
tion. A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Pales-
tinian Deadlock, Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, p. 80.
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However, and notwithstanding the general optimism prevailing in the first half of the 
nineties, the reality of Israeli policies on the ground was far removed from what was 
publicly declared. While the Oslo process laid the basis for the Palestinian Interim Self-
Government Authority (PA), thus prospecting the gradual withdrawal of the Israeli army 
from the OTs, the dismantlement of settlements and the final formation of a Palestinian 
state, the policy of territorial expansion was never effectively interrupted. On the contrary, 
the settlements and related infrastructures expansion continued at an accelerated pace, 
the settlers population nearly doubling its size in the nineties.17 The change of government 
never reversed that trend: Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu or Barak, all continued to expand the 
settlements on the very same land that, according to the interim agreements, was going 
to be handed over to the PA.
This is both for structural and ideological reasons. First, settlements are not the initiative 
of fanatic, ultra-orthodox groups against the will of the state. Instead, all the settlements’ 
endeavour is coordinated, funded and planned by successive Israeli governments, 
but also by various powerful state agencies, such as the Jewish National Agency, the 
World Zionist Organisation and the Jewish National Fund, which are beyond democratic 
control. Moreover, most of the settlements are strategically placed for scarce water 
resources’ control and for military reasons. Common analysis greatly underestimates the 
economic and military enterprise that settlements entail and the enormous cost of their 
dismantlement.18
Second, those currents of Zionism, which hold that withdrawing from the West Bank 
would make no political or moral sense or would even defy the will of God, are very 
powerful in Israeli society and state institutions. The West Bank highlands, the biblical 
Judaea and Samaria, are in fact at the centre of the Zionist dream of restoring the 
promised land of Israel. Any precise stand on this issue or any final definition of Israeli 
borders excluding the West Bank would open the Pandora box of internal Zionist-Israeli 
contradictions around the final sense and the nature of the State itself. That is not to say 
that Israeli public opinion unanimously sustains settlements, on the contrary it is quite 
divided on this issue. But the opponents of the settlements policy lack sufficient political 
cohesion to affect state policies seriously or even to impose a serious national debate 
on the question. Moreover, the way the peace process was carried out since the outset 
and the absence of any real international pressure further contributed to downplay the 
impact of settlements on the conflict in the eyes of Israeli mainstream public.19 
The Oslo process was framed since the beginning in a way to postpone final status 
negotiations (the status of Jerusalem, the fate of Palestinian refugees, final borders of the 
Palestinian state, control of water resources) and in effect never tackled the heart of the 
problem: the continuation of territorial expansion and the role of the governments and of 
the unchecked state agencies in funding, planning, expanding the settlements and related 
infrastructures.20 Nor a debate was ever started on the consequences of maintaining 
Israel as a Jewish state. Moreover, Oslo enabled successive Israeli governments to begin 
separating the two people and to start an Israeli de-responsabilisation with respect to 
Palestinians, without having to end the occupation and thus the control of territory.  
With all these characteristics, the Oslo process further contributed to reinforce the 
national Zionist consensus as it set the basis for the escalation of violence on the 
Palestinian side and to the relegation of Israeli responsibility to a less than secondary 
position. All this in a situation in which, at the end of the eighties the experience of 
occupation on the Israeli side and the first Intifada on the Palestinian side, could have 
provided the historical opportunity for a radical reconsideration of Israeli policies. 
The Oslo process collapsed in September 2000 after the failure of Camp David II21 and the 
outbreak of a new uprising in the OTs, this time highly militarised and extremely violent. 
The election in 2001 brought to power the new leader of Likud, Ariel Sharon. Whether 
or not the new Israeli leadership was still committed to Oslo was, at this point, not an 
issue.  Sharon immediately took the position that no negotiations would resume until 
violence ended and the government (which included Labour in a ‘national coalition’) was 
spared the need to further define its political stance. By endorsing the Quartet Roadmap 
in 2003, Sharon in theory agreed to a platform implying a freeze on settlements, the 
creation of a Palestinian State and a final status agreement. But the reservations posed 
by the Israeli Prime Minister premised any Israeli obligation on Palestinian performance 
on security and political reform, thus voiding the Road Map of any significance.  
1.3
 The failure of Oslo 
and the policy of 
unilateral disengagement 
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The escalation of violence and the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign inside Israel 
created the conditions for the security discourse to prevail above anything else and further 
reduced the chances for an effective domestic debate on territorial expansion policies. 
Palestinian violence reinforced the Israeli mainstream opinion that Palestinians are incapable 
of governing themselves, innately violent and no partner for peace. In that situation, it was 
straightforward to establish as a primary goal of any Israeli policy the protection of Israel from 
Palestinian violence and bring the separation policy to the extreme also with the construction 
of the ‘security barrier’ within the OTs, approved by Sharon in 2002.
In this way the chances for an Israeli public sensibilisation to Palestinian deteriorating 
conditions in the OTs were very low. Quite differently from the situation during the first 
Intifada, the Sharon government had a solid national consensus on the ‘security’ rationale 
of IDF policies in the territories based on a short-term strategy of reasserting control, 
fragmenting Palestinian entities and applying various forms of collective punishment. 
Sharon’s own political initiative with respect to a solution of the conflict, was first declared at 
the Herziliya conference in December 2003 and implied a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza 
Strip and from 4 isolated settlements in the West Bank for a total of about 8.000 settlers.
The unilateral withdrawal was carried out amidst a great media campaign and settlers 
opposition in August 2005. Less attention was given by the media to the unremitting 
expansion of settlements in other areas of the West Bank.22 
While making sure that no negotiation was imposed on Israel, Sharon was in fact starting 
to rationalize the Israeli presence in the OTs, pulling out from highly populated Palestinian 
enclaves while laying the basis for effectively annexing the majority of the West Bank.
As asserted by Dov Weisglass,23 who has been involved in the formulation and execution of 
Sharon’s policies as the Prime Minister’s Senior Advisor, the disengagement was actually 
intended to prevent any peace process, consign the Road Map to oblivion, and preclude 
the emergence of a Palestinian State of any kind. Given the condition posed by Sharon’s 
government on the Road Map, “Palestinians would have to turn into Finns” before any 
negotiation could resume, “effectively this whole package called the Palestinian state, with 
all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda […] and all this with the 
[US] presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of congress”.24   
Despite Weisglass’ assurances, Sharon’s plan triggered a major fracture within the Likud. To part 
of the Likud establishment and constituency, even a very limited withdrawal was still perceived 
as a major blow to the Greater Israel goal.25  The split inside the Likud helped to promote within 
Israel as well as internationally the idea of a sudden conversion of Sharon, but, as powerfully 
explained by Henry Siegman,26 the fracture within the Israeli right was mainly ‘tactical’ rather 
than ‘strategic’: the strategy remaining that of enlarging the Jewish state as much as possible.
The internal Likud fracture brought the advantage to Sharon of appearing as a moderate 
leader, the “Israeli De Gaulle”, as Siegman put it, capable of imposing to the nation the 
compromises necessary for a lasting peace. Moreover, the unilateral withdrawal could 
be, as in fact it was, successfully marketed to a compliant international community and a 
securitised domestic public opinion as the only possible ‘peace initiative’. And, in fact, to 
the surprise of Sharon’s detractors, Labour gave its full support to the plan, officially as a 
positive precedent that would lead to further withdrawals from the West Bank.
During the nineties, the distance between the Likud and Labour had in fact gradually 
diminished. As put forward by a Likud member in an ICG interview: 
“The Israeli public has awakened from its big dreams. The left dreamt of a new Middle East 
and a romantic kind of peace, the right of Eretz Yisrael Hashlema [Greater Israel]. The left woke 
up from its dream after the breakdown of the peace process and the violence…. The right 
realises that the isolated settlements will not be ours. Some 70 % of the public is in the centre. 
They say they are the ones who will draw up the map of the future Palestinian state”.27 
Or, as we would rather put it, while the right had shown its pragmatic side with Sharon, 
the Labour had understood in the Oslo years that any serious withdrawal was impossible 
without putting in question the ideological and institutional foundations of the State of 
Israel itself.  With the complete failure of the Oslo process and the crisis of the left, it was 
then unproblematic to find a Likud-Labour alliance and actually, the Labour party formed 
the backbone of Sharon’s support in the Knesset for the disengagement plan, joining the 
two Sharon governments in 2001 and 2003.  
22 D. Etkes (2005), Construction in the Settlements, 
Peace Now Reports, October. 
 http://www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=
61&fld=191&docid=1518; Foundation for Middle East 
Peace, Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied 
Territories, Vol. 15 No. 6, November/December 2005, 
http://www.fmep.org/reports/vol15/no6/index.html
23 “The Big Freeze”, An interview with Dov Weisglass, 
by A. Shavit, Haaretz, October 1, 2004.
24 Ibid.
25 ICG (2005), Disengagement and After: Where Next 
for Sharon and the Likud?, Middle East Report N° 36, 
1 March.
26 H. Siegman (2004), “Sharon and the Future of Pal-
estine”, The New York Review of Books, 2 May.
27 ICG interview with Gil Samsanov, head of the 
Likud’s Ramat Aviv branch, Tel Aviv, 15 August 2004 
in ICG (2005), Disengagement and After: Where Next 
for Sharon and the Likud?, Middle East Report No. 36, 
1 March, p. 5.
17 Foundation for Middle East Peace, Settlements In-
formation, Statistics,
http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/statistics.html 
(accessed June 2006).
18 V. Tilley, op. cit., chap. 2.
19 R. HaCohen (2006), “The Ideology of Occupation 
Revisited”, Letter From Israel/Antiwar.com, 26 June, 
http://www.antiwar.com/hacohen/?articleid=9178; 
Interview with Israeli scholars, Tel Aviv, May 2006.
20 See for instance N. Guyatt (1998), The Absence of 
Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 
London: Zed Press. 
21 See H. Agha and R. Malley (2001), “Camp David: The 
Tragedy of Errors”, The New York Review of Books, 48, 
no. 13, 9 August.
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At the end of 2005, the time was ripe for Sharon to launch a new political party in the centre 
of the political spectrum, which aimed at reproducing the kind of national consensus that 
Labour enjoyed in the early years after 1948.28 The new party, Kadima (Forward) was in fact 
established in December 2005 and joined by many former Likud and Labour members. 
The sudden disappearance of Sharon from the political scene due to a serious stroke in 
January 2006 probably impeded in March the expected landslide victory of the party, which 
nevertheless came out to be the largest party on the Israeli political scene. 
The new Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, followed the path opened by his predecessor 
Sharon. The new word he chose for the Israeli strategy towards the OTs was in the months 
following elections  ‘convergence’ (also ‘realignment’ or ‘ingathering’ from the Hebrew 
word ‘hitkansut’), a deceiving way to describe the continuation of Sharon’s policy of 
leaving the more densely populated Palestinian areas out of direct Israeli responsibility 
(but not necessarily control as recent events in Gaza demonstrate) while progressing 
undisturbed on the policy of annexation of large chunks of the West Bank. This policy is 
not only unilateral, but also very vague, as a precise map of Israel announced withdrawal 
in the West Bank has never been formally presented, nor has Olmert ever defined, beyond 
nebulous declarations to the press, where the ultimate borders of the state of Israel will 
be. However, what appears crystal clear looking at a map is that no viable Palestinian state 
will emerge from the scattered chunks of territories left in between growing settlements 
and their infrastructure.
After the military re-occupation and destruction of the Gaza strip and the ferocious war 
against Lebanon of July-August 2006, it is likely that in the next few months we will see 
new attempts at some forms of negotiations between Israel, PLO/PA and other regional 
actors.  The appeal of the unilateral ‘disengagement’ or ‘convergence’ formula has received 
a blow in terms of Israeli public opinion support. However, this is mainly because it failed to 
provide security and not for a growing public awareness of the contradictions highlighted 
above. 
The desperate situation in the OTs (see PART II of this report) and the Israeli public opinion 
dimmed by the security discourse do not leave much hope for the formation of an internal 
opposition capable of questioning the underlying logic guiding Israeli policies over time. 
Beyond the ups and downs of politics and the different strategic and diplomatic frameworks, 
the internal structural determinants of conflict remain relatively constant and undisputed. 
As already stated, in fact, a serious reconsideration of Israeli domestic policies and a 
serious withdrawal would directly question Israeli national unity, the nationalist Zionist 
pact or the unwritten compromise between different political currents, and would forcefully 
highlight the question of the identity (liberal, secular, orthodox, ultra orthodox) and of the 
definitive borders of the state of Israel. 
At the moment, there are no domestic nor international incentives to start such a painful, 
however necessary, reconsideration. To this predicament is largely responsible the 
international community that never took, beyond declarations, a strong stance against 
territorial expansion or internal discriminatory policies, thus providing an external indirect 
acceptance to the existing Israeli policies.
28 See I. Pappé in the Appendix.
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In the previous paragraph we identified the main Israeli domestic drivers of conflict with 
the so-called ‘demography’ question or the main Zionist tenet to preserve Israel as a 
Jewish state, and with the policy of territorial expansion. We argued that both issues were 
never seriously reconsidered and debated in Israel, notwithstanding the apparent reversal 
of policies implied by the Oslo process and, more recently, by the policy of unilateral 
disengagement. One of the main reasons for this is the lack of serious pressures to do so 
coming from the international community, or at the very least the lack of an international 
environment generating the incentives for such a reconsideration. 
Israel was recognised both by the US and by European states shortly after its declaration of 
independence in 1948. The country maintained throughout its history preferential relations 
both with the US, its main financial supporter after 1967, and the European states. This is 
largely due to fact that Israel is a pro-Western ‘first world’ country in an ideal geostrategic 
position for monitoring politics in the world’s prime oil field. Moreover, the US and European 
friendship to Israel has also strong moral and cultural bases, such as fulfilling the ‘historical 
obligation’ of protecting the ‘Jewish people’; standing by a ‘Western’ ally; or supporting the 
‘only democracy in the Middle East’.
Israel’s close political, economic and cultural ties with the West did not impede the 
international official condemnation of the acquisition of territories by force and of 
settlements construction after 1967.  UN resolution 242 was passed with the wide 
consensus of the international community and with the full endorsement of the US and 
European states. However, no political will has ever been spent on its implementation.
At the end of the eighties, a number of international and regional factors, such as the end 
of the Cold War, the Iraq war and the first Palestinian uprising in the OTs, convinced the US 
to act as the mediator of a peace process, while the EC/EU supported negotiations and 
provided a great amount of funding for the gradual institutionalisation of the Palestinian 
National Authority (see PART II of this report).  Oslo was based on the famous formula ‘land 
for peace’, but no international monitoring mechanism was put in place to check the Israeli 
compliance with the interim agreements. 
Moreover, the international actors involved in the process, namely the US and, with a 
mainly financial role, the EU, accepted the way Oslo was framed for ‘solving’ the territorial 
aspect of the conflict, while remaining largely silent on the Palestinian refugees issue that, 
together with the question of the status of the Palestinian non-Jewish citizens of Israel, 
directly or indirectly relate to the nature of the Israeli state and to its Jewish character. 
The international acquiescence towards Israel expansionist policies and the neglect of 
the refugees issue, not only hampered the Oslo peace process, but also provided a strong 
framework for legitimising or at least acquiescing to Israeli violation of international law. 
During the nineties, the gap between the policies on the ground and diplomatic rhetoric 
widened greatly. Despite increasing evidence that Israeli policies in the OTs were at odds 
with the stated aims of the peace process, international actors turned a blind eye. The EU 
went to the point of funding Labour NGOs for peace (such as the Peres Centre for Peace), 
without acknowledging that settlements expansion was also a Labour governments policy. 
Ironically, the international acceptance of a two states solution to the conflict grew even 
stronger at the end of the nineties, while settlements’ expansion on the ground was 
seriously undermining it.29 
In this context of international unconditional support, all other efforts for a peaceful 
solution to the conflict were distorted and even counter-productive. For instance, the 
international and mainly EU funding of the PA was aimed at sustaining a state-building 
process. However, considering the lack of genuine bilateral negotiation, it contributed to a 
financial and moral de-responsabilisation of Israel with respect to the occupation.30 
With the collapse of Oslo and the eruption of violence, the international community accepted 
the ‘security first’ vision promoted by Israel, abiding to Israeli conditions for negotiations and 
putting the pressure mainly on the Palestinian side. No serious effort was made to halt Israeli 
grave violation of human rights in the OTs in the context of the 2002-2003 military operations. 
In 2003, the Road Map promoted by the Quartet (USA, EU, Russia and the UN) called for a 
freeze of settlements’ construction, but again did not provide any monitoring or enforcing 
system to make sure it was actually respected. Moreover, as we already mentioned, it posed 
all preconditions for negotiation on the PA side, leaving Israel free to pursue its policies in the 
meantime. 
2. External 
Influences on 
Israel: The Policy 
of Unconditional 
Support
29 The EU endorsed the two states solution at the Eu-
ropean Council in Berlin, 24-25 March 1999; the US, 
with the Bush speech of the 24 June 2002. 
30 A. Le More (2005), “Killing with Kindness: Funding 
the Demise of a Palestinian State”, International Af-
fairs, vol. 81, n° 5, October, pp.983-1001.
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When, at the end of 2003, Sharon presented his disengagement plan, the US and behind 
it all the Quartet was ready to accept it, notwithstanding it was clearly in violation with 
the Road Map which aimed at reaching a negotiated two-states solutions. While the EU 
set out formal conditions for its acceptance of the plan, in practice it did little to enforce or 
encourage compliance, resulting in its unconditional acceptance of Israeli unilateralism. 
The official US acceptance of the Sharon disengagement plan contained also a new 
element, that of hinting at the possible official acceptance of Israeli settlements in the OTs 
as ‘new realities on the ground.’31 Also the EU, in a more subtle and passive form, failed 
to effectively respond to the Israeli interpretation of its territorial scope including the OTs 
in all contractual ties with the Union. This means that the EU violates by acquiescence 
international humanitarian law by extending its benefits to Israeli illegal settlements. 
Israel ‘de-facto expansion’ is thus determining a ‘de-jure annexation’ and all this with the 
blessing of the US and the passive compliance of the other Quartet members. 
As far as the EU is concerned, the period since 2000 saw a multiplication of declarations 
criticizing Israeli violation of human rights.32 However, to the declaratory level didn’t 
correspond a comparable political and/or economic action.  The EU and more so some of 
its member states, such as Germany, are in fact very sensible to Israeli accusation of anti-
Semitism and to any strain of relations with the country.
31 See Foundation for Middle East Peace, Resources, 
Official Documents: Sharon letter to US President 
Bush on disengagement http://www.fmep.org/re-
sources/official_documents/sharon_letter_to_bush.
html and Bush reply http://www.fmep.org/resources/
official_documents/bush_letter_to_sharon.html (ac-
cessed June 2006).
32 See for instance the EU endorsement of the ruling 
of the International Court of Justice in 2004. 
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The first observation to make when analysing Palestinian domestic politics is the fact that 
Palestine is not a state. Linked to this, the Palestinian national movement has pursued the 
triple goals of liberation, democratic state-building, and the respect of both individual and 
collective rights. These three goals are not necessarily incompatible. Nonetheless, their 
concomitant pursuit and in particular the strategies employed to pursue them can and have 
led to contradictory approaches. All the structural and ideological issues analysed below 
derive from this first basic premise and from the non-state context in which the Palestinian 
domestic scene has evolved. 
The duality between the PA and the PLO
The Palestinian Liberation Organization, established in 1964, became dominated by the 
secular nationalist Fateh in 1968-69 and has continued to be so since then. Despite the 
presence of other secular factions in the organization, such as the Palestinian Front for 
National Liberation (PFLP), the Democratic Front for National Liberation (DFLP) and the 
People’s Party, Fateh has always been at the core of the PLO and of its institutions (e.g., 
the Executive Committee and the Palestinian National Council). The PLO leadership was 
based outside the occupied territories (OTs) until the signature of the 1993 Declaration 
of Principles. With the ensuing formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, the PLO 
Executive Committee based in Tunis returned to the OTs to establish the PA. Since then, a 
conspicuous duality has emerged between the PLO and the PA, with important ramifications 
on the evolution of the conflict. 
The PA is a direct offspring of the PLO and of Israel, and of the peace process between 
them. Moreover the PA was meant to materialize one of the PLO’s national goals, i.e., 
the establishment of a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The mandates of the PLO 
and the PA thus remained distinct and complementary in principle. The PLO, as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people, would conduct negotiations with Israel. The PA 
could not take on these tasks because it did not represent all (and not even a majority) of 
the Palestinian people. In addition, the PA - borne out of the peace process with Israel - was 
dependent on the peace process and could therefore not credibly shape it. The PA in fact 
renounced the use of violent resistance and would essentially provide representation and 
services to the Palestinians in the OTs in anticipation of a Palestinian state. 
Yet over the 1990s and 2000s, the lines separating the two organizations became increasingly 
blurred, contributing to the fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement. The PA 
came to take precedence over the PLO in conducting relations with Israel. The PA Cabinet 
overshadowed the PLO Executive Committee, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 
overtook the role and functions of the Palestinian National Council, and the PA Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs took precedence over the PLO Political Department. Part of the reason 
for this rebalancing was practical - the PLO, scattered throughout the Middle East, is 
not easily run and democratically managed. Another reason for duplication was that the 
personalities involved were partly the same, and thus the need to formally and practically 
set out a division of labour was not considered of primary importance. The PA was de facto 
controlled by the elements of the PLO leadership parachuted into the OTs from Tunis.
The growing dominance of the PA over the PLO generated resentment and distancing between 
the Palestinians in the OTs and in the Diaspora. It also created divisions between those within 
the PLO who had accepted the Oslo agreements and those who had not.33 Resentment and 
division became all the more acute when after 2000, PA officials who conducted relations with 
Israel hinted at their readiness to compromise on issues such as the right of return, despite 
their non-representation of the vast majority of the refugees. Track-two initiatives such as the 
2002 Ayalon-Nusseibeh plan or the 2003 Geneva accords and the public outcry they generated 
amongst the refugee communities especially outside the OTs highlighted this fact. 
In terms of impact on the conflict, this overlap cum fragmentation led to a to-ing and fro-ing 
on commitments made or hinted at in the context of the peace process. On the one hand, 
the PA leadership, who did not represent the Diaspora and whose existence hinged upon 
the continuation of the peace process, had accepted not to raise contentious final status 
issues during the Oslo process and hinted at possible concessions. On the other hand, 
when push came to shove (as it did at Camp David II in 2000 or at Taba in 2001), that very 
same leadership, inherently tied to the PLO, ultimately refused to renege on claims such 
as the right of return or Jerusalem. The impact this had on Israel and on the international 
community was a sense of betrayal and loss of faith in the Palestinian leadership and in its 
ability to deliver and press its public into accepting their offers. 
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The fragmentation and decline of Fateh
The second key change which took place since the beginning of the Oslo process, culminating 
after its demise, was the fragmentation and decline of Fateh itself. The PLO/Fateh leadership 
arrived from Tunis to the OTs, retaining control of key Fateh structures such as the Central 
Committee and the Revolutionary Council. Yet within the OTs a new class of indigenous 
young Fateh activists had emerged and consolidated particularly through first intifada. This 
sowed the seeds for a growing schism within Fateh itself. These trends exacerbated over 
the Oslo years, when the local population and Fateh’s rank-and-file became increasingly 
disillusioned with their ‘imported’ leaders. Disillusionment was linked to the evolution of 
the peace process, which after 1996 seemed to bring with it growing Israeli colonization 
without tangible peace dividends. Disillusionment was also connected to the growing 
perception of the authoritarianism, corruption, and lack of transparency and accountability 
of the Fateh-dominated PA. Fateh’s decline materialized soon after the start of the second 
intifada, partly because Fateh’s shift to armed confrontation merely underlined the failure 
of its previous strategy of peace talks. Decline exacerbated after Arafat’s death, given that 
despite being much criticized, the PLO Chairman/PA President/Fateh leader had remained 
the coalescing factor of the Palestinian people and of Fateh up until his death. 
The growing divisions and the weakening of Fateh contributed to the eruption and 
evolution of the second intifada, the progressive weakening of the Palestinian side and 
the escalation of conflict. Much has been written about the origins of the second intifada 
and the extent to which it was ignited, managed or controlled by the PA leadership. A 
widespread assessment is that the intifada started as a spontaneous revolt against Israel 
as well as the PA leadership; although it was then ‘appropriated’ by Arafat as a means to 
regain support amongst the disaffected public.34 The chaotic evolution of the intifada was 
also linked to the fragmentation of Fateh. Fateh was unable to develop its own strategy of 
resistance both because of the decline in the capability and morale of the PA police force, 
and because of its fragmentation into competing local bands under no organized chain of 
command and beyond the bounds of official PA security structures. 
Fateh’s fragmentation and decline also validated the Israeli perception of the absence of 
a Palestinian ‘partner’.35 The Fateh leadership proved unable to rein in or impose any form 
of strategic direction on the violent intifada, including the activities of Fateh’s own Tanzim 
apparatus, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees, as well 
as of other factions (i.e., Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PFLP). This was due to the loosening 
hold of the older upper echelons of Fateh on its ‘young guard’ and to the divisions within 
the young guard itself.36 This bolstered greatly the Israeli rhetoric on the absence of a 
Palestinian ‘partner for peace’ and contributed to the feeling of existential threat generated 
in Israel by the Palestinian suicide bombing campaign within the 1948 borders. Likewise 
the growing intra-Fateh tensions, which culminated in internal violence and in a split within 
Fateh in the run-up to the 2006 parliamentary elections, added to the general perception 
in Israel and in the international community of the inability of the Palestinians to manage 
their internal affairs and thus run a future state.37 
A final effect of Fateh’s decline was the empowerment of Hamas, which affected relations 
with Israel as well as with the international community. Fateh’s unrelenting decline 
contributed to Hamas’ crushing victory in January 2006. The ‘Change and Reform Platform’ 
(Hamas) won 74 seats in the 132-seat PLC, compared to Fateh’s 45 seats. A significant 
number of people who would normally have voted Fateh, switched to Hamas.38 Even if the 
reason for this was partly a protest vote and a tactical switch, the electoral result reflected 
a much deeper and possibly irreversible trend in Fateh’s decline in view of its discredited 
reputation and internal divisions. 
The non-inclusiveness of the Palestinian political system
A third major structural Palestinian factor influencing the conflict has been the non-
inclusiveness of the Palestinian political system; in particular, the exclusion of the Islamic 
factions (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) from the PLO and from the PA (in the case of Hamas up 
until the 2006 elections). The non-inclusiveness of the Palestinian political system had two 
major detrimental effects with accompanying repercussions on the conflict. 
First, it failed to induce convergence towards moderation of the excluded Islamic factions 
and of Hamas in particular. The exclusion of the Islamic factions from the secular PLO is 
due to a variety of reasons, not least their rejection of the 1988 PLO Charter accepting a 
two-state solution along the 1967 borders. The exclusion of these factions from the PA and 
its institutions was instead linked to their rejection of the Oslo accords, which founded 
33 In 1993, a majority rather than a unanimity of the 
PLO factions had approved the Declaration of Prin-
ciples. The Islamic factions, outside the PLO, had re-
jected the Oslo accords. 
34 See for example the Mitchell Report (2000) as well 
as independent analyses by Y. Sayigh (2001), “Ara-
fat and the Anatomy of a Revolt”, Survival, Vol. 43, 
Autumn, pp. 47-60; M. Klein (2003), “The Origins of 
Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Pales-
tinians”, February 2003, www.fmep.org.
35 Interview with Palestinian scholar, Jerusalem, May 
2006. 
36 On the old-guard/young-guard distinction see K. 
Shikaki (2002), “Palestinians Divided”, Foreign Af-
fairs, Vol. 81/1, January/February, p. 92. For a more 
complex picture of intra-Fateh divisions see S. Tamari 
(2002), “Who Rules Palestine?”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 102-113. 
37 The split occurred between the old-guard-domi-
nated Fateh and the young guard, which provisionally 
seceded into a new movement called The Future ‘el-
mustaqbal’. On the eve of the elections, the split was 
patched-over in a last ditch attempt to avoid electoral 
defeat.
38 See polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for 
Policy and Survey Research (www.pcpsr.org) or by the 
Near East Consulting (www.neareastconsulting.com).
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the Authority. Hence, their non-participation in the first general elections in 1996. Operating 
outside the legal political system did little to mould the strategies pursued by these factions. 
Although over the Oslo years and since Oslo’s demise, Hamas has internally debated a 
possible revision of its strategy and Charter, the movement as a whole has yet to officially 
alter its platform. Up until when the public had faith in the peace process, the exclusion of 
these factions only presented a limited problem, given their minority popular appeal. The 
problem exacerbated in view of the rising popular strength since 2000 of Hamas in particular. 
This rise outside the legal political system had an important radicalizing effect on the public. 
It also gave Hamas the opportunity to pragmatically assess the most expedient moment 
to bargain its way into the political system. Hence, its participation in the 2004 and 2005 
municipal elections, the March 2005 Cairo declaration in which Hamas accepted a unilateral 
lull in violence (tahadia) in return for an agreement to enter the PLO and to participate in the 
PLC elections; and finally its participation and victory in the 2006 elections. 
The entry of Hamas into the legal political system could have helped the gradual moderation 
of the movement. This is especially so given the evident differences in opinions which 
exist within Hamas and the fact that the Palestinian public is not committed to growing 
conservatism or Islamism, and less still to an unending struggle against Israel for the whole 
of mandate Palestine. Given the state of public opinion, the moderate currents of Hamas 
could have a greater chance of gaining the upper hand if they were to operate within the legal 
political system rather than outside it. However, the rising tensions within the OTs in 2006 
and Fateh’s reluctance to transfer power to Hamas has empowered the more radical elements 
within Hamas. It has also induced Hamas to continue acting as an opposition force outside 
the confines of the legal political system despite its (theoretical) control of government.   
Second, non-inclusiveness consolidated the symbiotic relationship between Fateh and the 
PA. Given the absence of a credible, strong and legal opposition, the PA became dominated by 
Fateh in terms of leadership, administration and personnel. This harmed the good governance 
potential of the PA by hindering the checks and balances inbuilt in the PA, which were developed 
particularly through the PA reform process in 2002-05. It weakened Fateh ‘s reputation, as the 
public identified in Fateh the locus of responsibility for the PA’s ill-governance. It also distorted 
Palestinian incentives, hindering the effective pursuit of their national objectives. Finally, 
this symbiotic relationship generated strong personal and institutional incentives within 
Fateh to dress up the PA with symbols of statehood. This contributed to the international 
misperception and rhetoric that a Palestinian state was in the making. Following the collapse 
of the Oslo process, it also generated strong Fateh disincentives against dissolving the PA. 
This would have constituted a public admission that a Palestinian state was/is not being built. 
Publicly admitting this reality would represent a strategic decision, which would reduce the 
gap between realities and international (mis)perceptions and could induce a more effective 
pursuit of Palestinian national objectives. While often hinted at and discussed,39 Fateh never 
seriously considered dissolving the PA. 
Perhaps most gravely, Fateh’s symbiotic relationship with the PA exacerbated the 
polarization between Fateh and Hamas, contributing to the mounting chaos in the OTs 
in 2005-06. Fateh’s identification with the PA prevented Fateh from serenely transferring 
the reins of power to Hamas, thus failing to play the only plausible role that could have 
restored its reputation: that of an effective but peaceful opposition. The lure of retaking 
government through quicker and coercive means proved too strong. Hence, the attempted 
re-centralization of power in the president’s hands and the brinkmanship tactics employed 
particularly in the summer and autumn of 2006. The ensuing Fateh-Hamas tensions both at 
elite and rank-and-file level triggered rising lawlessness and chaos on the streets of Gaza, 
as well as the failure of all attempts to broker a national unity government in the autumn of 
2006. The prospects for a long-lasting and structural reconciliation within the Palestinian 
body politic appear as dim as ever. 
If structures and institutions lie on the one hand of the domestic equation, perceived 
interests, identities and ideologies lie on the other. As in the case of structure, Palestinian 
factors lying in the sphere of interests and ideas are also shaped by the Palestinian non-
state context. 
The PLO and Fateh’s Uneasy Transition from National Liberation to State-building
More concretely, the triple Palestinian aims of state-building, national liberation and the 
respect of human rights have often been conceptualised and pursued in a contradictory 
manner, with ensuing effects on the conflict. The PLO and Fateh underwent a process of 
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transition from a national liberation movement primarily focused on individual rights into a 
state-building project mainly targeted to fulfil collective rights. The PLO’s first Charter put 
forth the aim of liberating the entire and indivisible Palestinian homeland from the river 
to the sea. This would bring with it both the affirmation of Palestinian self-determination 
and the respect of Palestinian rights of return. The Charter was amended in 1968, placing 
greater emphasis on collective rights (i.e., state-building) over individual rights of return. 
This shift continued when in 1988 the PLO re-amended its Charter, accepting the goal of 
Palestinian statehood within a portion of mandate Palestine. It culminated with the 1993 
Declaration of Principles and the ensuing modifications in the PLO Charter in 1996. Since 
then, the views of Fateh and of the PLO regarding the main contours of an acceptable peace 
deal have not perceptibly changed. Despite differences in opinion within the faction,40 
Fateh and the bulk of the PLO have generally stood for a sovereign Palestinian state within 
the 1967 borders, a capital in East Jerusalem, and a reasonable deal on refugees whereby 
Israel would recognize in principle the right of return while the practical implementation of 
that right would be the subject of political compromise. 
The transition from liberation and individual rights into state-building and collective rights 
has not been smooth, explaining in part the fragmentation of Fateh and its loss of credibility in 
Israeli and international eyes. More accurately, the PLO and Fateh shifted uneasily from being 
a guerrilla movement enmeshed in conflict to being a civilian political force at the head of a 
would-be-state pledging to become a key provider of Israel’s security even prior to the end of 
conflict. Not least because of the continuation of conflict over the course of the Oslo process, 
Fateh continued to think and act largely as a paramilitary faction, failing to use its powers to 
address public concerns about poor governance, insecurity and economic decline. 
Arafat’s mode of governance exacerbated this tendency. Rather than laying the ground for 
statehood, Arafat continued to see his role as that of leader of a liberation movement, who 
could not afford to indulge in the secondary goals of democracy and good governance, 
worthy as these might be. The Chairman-President’s mode of governance contributed to 
the deinstitutionalization of Palestinian politics through a concentration of power in his 
hands and an ensuing creation of patronage networks also used to finance the PLO in the 
Diaspora. The responsibility for this situation lay also with the rank-and-file of Fateh, who 
were willing to be co-opted into the neo-patrimonial system created by Arafat.
This stalled transition proved to be highly detrimental to the peace process. During the 
Oslo process, Israel and the international community were largely content with a PA 
which, despite its democratic shortfalls, was effective in providing security to Israel. 
However, even during the Oslo years, the nature and performance of the PA fuelled conflict 
dynamics. Arafat’s focus on retaining domestic control reinforced Israel’s domination. 
These dynamics exacerbated with the eruption of the militarized intifada. Arafat’s control 
and de-institutionalization of politics, coupled with his tacit connivance with the intifada, 
ultimately proved self-destructive by facilitating Israeli counter-measures. Yet Arafat had 
pursued this strategy precisely, albeit mistakenly, as a means of coercing Israel and the US 
into renewing the Oslo pact recognizing his central status as principal interlocutor.
Hamas’ Oscillations  between Radicalism and Pragmatism 
Hamas underwent a reverse process of transition. The faction developed between the start 
of Israeli occupation in 1967 and the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987 as an indigenous, 
unarmed grassroots movement, focused on social and cultural issues. As such, it never 
joined the PLO and only developed a modest military capability in the mid-1980s. It was 
officially established as a political faction in 1987, which shifted towards open confrontation 
with Israel in 1988, i.e., precisely at the time when Fateh and the PLO began moderating 
their national objectives. Hamas radicalized further following the Oslo accords, by placing 
itself on the rejectionist front and refusing to enter the PA. Having acquired since 1987 an 
explicit Islamist counter-discourse to the PLO’s secular nationalism, Hamas claimed that 
the entire land from the river to the sea had to be liberated in virtue of its status as an 
indivisible Islamic waqf.
Yet despite its rhetoric, Hamas proved to be a pragmatic, even opportunistic limited spoiler 
rather than an unmoveably ideological total spoiler.41 Hamas has for years mentioned its 
acceptance of a long-term truce in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state 
on the 1967 borders and the recognition of Palestinian refugee rights. In 2005-06 Hamas 
was far more successful than Fateh in adhering to the ceasefire, not least because of its 
organizational ability to enforce it. Hamas’ elites have debated for months their possible 
revision of the Hamas Charter, purging it of outright anti-Semitic statements.42 In the summer 
of 2006, key members of Hamas either accepted or signalled their possible acceptance 
39 See for example Bitter Lemons, ‘The Collapse of the 
PA’, 28 August 2006, Edition 34. 
40 Differences of opinion have related both to strat-
egies (e.g., Abbas’ rejection of violent resistance, 
contrasted to Marwan Barghouti’s support for violent 
resistance within the OTs) and to final status sub-
stance issues. 
41 See ICG (2006), Enter Hamas: The Challenges of 
Political Integration, Middle East Report N° 49, 18 
January.
42 O. Halpern (2006), “Hamas working on a new Char-
ter”, The Jerusalem Post, 16 February.
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of the prisoners’ document and the March 2002 Arab League initiative, which expressly 
advocate a two-state solution. Hamas has also hinted at the possibility of recognizing 
Israel upon the latter’s recognition of Palestine.43 
This is not to say that peace and compromise with Hamas would be simple or perhaps even 
feasible. Particularly in its stance on violence, Hamas has acted in a ruthlessly unprincipled 
manner. Hamas initially withheld from active participation in the intifada (October 2000-
January 2001) not out of principle, but out of suspicion that Fateh/Arafat were deliberately 
fomenting the conflict as a tactical means to improve their bargaining position. Only after 
the election of Ariel Sharon in February 2001 did Hamas embark on its suicide bombing 
campaign across the Green Line. In making this shift, Hamas acted opportunistically, seeking 
to confirm the collapse of the Oslo process and to present itself as an alternative to Fateh. 
Likewise, its post 2005 tahadia has not been the product of an ideological shift, but rather 
of a temporary decision determined by domestic political expediency (i.e., its decision to 
participate in elections and its bid to enter the PLO). Hamas’ pragmatism therefore does 
not necessarily render the faction less violent or more amenable to compromise. It does 
however entail that unlike purely ideological movements, Hamas’ pragmatism makes it 
sensitive to changing contextual conditions.
Beyond its radical political platform and military strategy, Hamas has distinguished itself 
as a social movement, with considerable experience in grassroots activism and managing 
social welfare programmes. When municipalities came under its control in 2004-05, it 
also demonstrated its greater ability (compared to Fateh) to conduct effective and clean 
government. Hamas built on its achievements at the municipal level to wage a successful 
national campaign to compete in the PLC elections, focusing primarily on corruption and 
the rule of law. This may seem counterintuitive for a party that maintains a military wing 
and advocates armed resistance against Israel. Yet as in the case of Fateh and the PLO, this 
is the by-product of the different and at times contrasting objectives characterising the 
Palestinian movement within a conflict-ridden and non-state context. 
Precisely because the evolution of Palestinian politics has been so critically shaped by 
context let us delve into the key channels in which the conflict has impacted upon the 
Palestinian domestic scene. The duality of the PLO-PA and the problematic transition of 
the Palestinian national movement was a direct result of relations with Israel through the 
peace process. The nature of the Oslo process, which called upon the PLO to abandon its 
goal of armed resistance in favour of negotiations with and protection of Israel through the 
PA, led to the duality between the two sets of institutions. It also generated the need in the 
PLO/Fateh to make the transition from national liberation to state-building. To make this 
transition, the Oslo process raised the incentives of its Palestinian signatories to seek ways 
to co-opt key sectors in society into accepting and respecting the international accords, 
thus opening the space for corruption and networks of patronage. 
Beyond the Oslo accords themselves, the growing gap which consolidated over the Oslo 
years between the rhetoric of statehood and the likelihood of its achievement contributed 
to the fragmentation of Palestinian politics, to the PA’s ill governance and to the decline of 
Fateh, matched by the rise of Hamas. 
Israel’s policies contributed to the fragmentation, de-institutionalization and ill-governance of 
the OTs. This was partly a legacy of the years of direct Israeli control of Palestinian civil affairs, 
which were characterized by segmented administration and lack of democratic accountability. 
During the Oslo years instead, Israel’s overarching control over access to/from the external 
world, coupled with its formal powers to restrict Palestinian use of land and natural resources 
rendered the Palestinian population and economy captive. This raised the opportunities for 
rent-seeking and manipulation by the PA. Over the course of the intifada instead, Israel’s 
policies accelerated exponentially the fragmentation of the Palestinian political space. This 
occurred by physically destroying the PA’s infrastructure, as well as by imposing closures and 
economic sanctions (e.g., withholding the PA’s tax revenues). 
The evolution of the Oslo process and its demise also contributed to the decline of Fateh 
and the rising popularity of Hamas. Post 1994, Fateh derived its main popular strength from 
its platform based on pursuing negotiations with Israel in order to achieve a Palestinian 
state. Over the Oslo years, Fateh’s credibility was tarnished by the rising appreciation by 
the Palestinian public that far from bringing with it peace and statehood, the Oslo process 
allowed Israel’s accelerating colonization of the OTs. Fateh’s standing fell dramatically, and 
its reputation was damaged perhaps irreparably with the end of the peace process and 
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Israel’s rhetoric of the absence of a Palestinian partner. In particular, Israel’s persisting 
colonization of Jerusalem, its rejection of negotiations and its refusal to release Palestinian 
prisoners, invalidated President Abbas’s pro-peace and compromise platform. On the other 
side of the coin, the failure of the peace process vindicated Hamas’ political platform. 
Indeed whereas during the Oslo years, Hamas never polled over 15-20%, it reached over 
30% support with the end of the peace process, and 44% in the January 2006 elections. 
Finally, the conflict contributed to the absence of a third force in Palestinian politics, which 
could have represented an alternative voice between Fateh and Hamas. On the one hand, 
small armed factions like Islamic Jihad or the PFLP lacked broad social constituencies 
and offered little that Fateh and Hamas did not already offer. On the other hand, the 
militarization of the intifada and Israel’s counter-violence silenced groups that withheld 
from military action (e.g., Fateh’s liberal wing, the Democratic People’s Party and the 
former communists). This was caused at least in part by the structural anomalies of the 
Palestinian context and the ensuing constraints facing a putative Palestinian civilian force 
in the absence of normal civilian politics within a defined state. 
International influences have contributed and often exacerbated Palestinian factors fuelling 
conflict. They have done so through two different yet interrelated logics of intervention.
Differentiated Empowerment
One logic has been that of differentiated domestic empowerment. This has had three 
primary features. First, the international community attempted (between 1994 and 2006) 
to empower the PA over and above the PLO. This may have partly been reasonable, in 
view of the objective of promoting  a Palestinian state. Hence, for example whereas the 
EU’s 1997 Interim Association Agreement was signed with the PLO, its 2004 ENP Action 
Plan was negotiated with the PA. However, the empowerment of the PA over the PLO both 
exacerbated the feeling of exclusion of the Diaspora, and it contributed to the duality and 
duplication of the two sets of institutions.
A second feature of differentiated empowerment is related to the sphere of civil society. 
Prior to the Oslo process, despite Israeli occupation, the Palestinian territories enjoyed a 
relatively vibrant civil society, largely based on service delivery, professional associations 
and trade unions. The Oslo process and the international funding that came with it distorted 
the nature of civil society, altering its focus, raising incentives for corruption and distancing 
it from the public. More specifically, international (and mainly Western) donors financed 
heavily liberal NGOs, geographically based in the Jerusalem-Ramallah area, and working on 
issues pertaining to the peace process. This occurred at the expense of other organizations 
focussing on services, non-peace process related issues, and geographically spread across 
the OTs. The result was the booming of new NGOs, as corrupt and enmeshed in networks 
of patronage as the PA, and whose work was often tailored to the political requirements of 
donors rather than to the needs of the population. In turn, service-based charities linked to 
Islamist movements readily filled the gap. 
The West also tried explicitly to empower Fateh at the expense of Hamas. Prior to the 2006 
PLC elections this entailed a clear neglect for the non-inclusiveness of the Palestinian legal 
political system, despite the negative implications discussed above. Moreover, in 2003 
largely through US and Israeli pressure, the EU decided to include Hamas on its terrorist 
list. This meant the absence of any official relations with Hamas. The only informal and 
intelligence-based contact which persisted was exclusively tailored to securing a unilateral 
Palestinian ceasefire. Following January elections, rather than exploring different channels 
to induce Hamas’ moderation, the EU and the US have attempted to re-empower Fateh at 
the expense of Hamas. This policy of differentiated empowerment has primarily taken the 
form of re-empowering the Fateh held presidency at the expense of the Hamas-dominated 
PLC and the Cabinet. Hence, having exerted much effort in 2002-05 in creating and 
empowering the post of prime minister (during Arafat’s presidency), and shifting the control 
of PA finances and security from the presidency to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of the Interior respectively, the Quartet began working assiduously in 2006 to undo these 
partial successes. In particular the Quartet’s decision in June 2006 to use an ‘International 
Temporary Mechanism’ to channel some funds to the PA presidency raised Fateh’s incentives 
partly to create de facto parallel governing structures under the presidency and partly to 
turn to brinkmanship against Hamas (e.g., through the general strike in September 2006). 
In a context in which Fateh, whose symbiotic relationship with the PA had already generated 
strong resistance to transit from office, the international community’s stance has reduced 
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further its incentives to shift into legal opposition. It concomitantly contributed to Hamas’ 
retrenchment and obstinacy in accepting internationally coerced conditions. In turn, rather 
than fostering a genuine national reconciliation, differentiated empowerment exacerbated 
polarization and violence between the internationally-supported Fatah and the boycotted 
Hamas. It has also fuelled the wider perceptions amongst Palestinians of Western hypocrisy 
when it comes to the rhetorical promotion of democracy. 
Carrots and Sticks
A second and related logic of external intervention has been that of using inducements and 
pressures through aid and sanctions. The international community and the EU in particular 
granted key sums of financial as well as technical assistance for the purpose of building 
Palestinian institutions after 1994. During the Oslo years, international assistance was 
granted to the PA largely unconditionally. The EU, the US and other Western donors paid 
little or no attention to the failings of the PA in the fields of democracy and governance. 
On the contrary, as put by one observer: ‘the PA regime was built with international funds 
at the cost of democracy, transparency, accountability, the rule of law and the respect for 
human rights’.44 Rather than democratic state-building in and of itself, the primary purpose 
of aid was that of sustaining the PA and allowing it to conduct negotiations with Israel and 
provide security to it. In view of the absence of a peace agreement with Israel, the PA’s 
violations of democracy and rights were often viewed as the necessary evil to ‘reign in the 
Palestinian street’ and maintain political momentum in negotiations.45
Aid to the Palestinians rose further during the intifada. This partly offset the financial 
costs imposed by Israel’s policies in the OTs. However, aid could not fundamentally alter 
the impact of the unremitting onslaught that PA institutions were subject to. As such, its 
purpose switched from state-building to institutional survival and humanitarian assistance. 
Aid alone during the intifada did not and could not alter the structure of the conflict. It 
rather fed into it by mitigating some of its most acute economic effects. In the absence 
of a comprehensive political involvement, donors subsidized the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank, tolerated the asphyxiation of the Gaza Strip, and acquiesced to the creeping 
annexation of East Jerusalem and other settlement blocs. In the words of Israeli journalist 
Amira Haas, aid primarily acted as ‘silence money’.46 
To the partial credit of the international community and the EU in particular, the 2002-05 
period did see an increasing use of reform conditionality. With Israel’s withholding of revenue 
transfers to the PA in 2000-03, the EU provided monthly budgetary assistance, making this 
conditional on several reforms especially in the fields of judicial and fiscal reform. In 2005, 
through EU COPPS (Coordinating Office for Palestinian Policing Support), upgraded through 
an ESDP police support mission and complemented by the ESDP Rafah monitoring mission, 
the EU also heavily committed itself to reform the Palestinian security sector.  
International and European attention to the internal functioning of the PA must however 
be analysed in the light of the evolving conflict. In view of the Palestinian suicide bombing 
campaign since 2001 and Israel’s refusal to pursue negotiations with the Palestinians, PA 
reform became the mantra of the day in the US and Israel. The US’s focus on reform was 
linked both to its demonization of Arafat and to its wider interest in ‘regime change’ in 
the aftermath of the 11 September attacks. The EU also focussed on PA reform. Yet this 
was only partly out of genuine concern for Palestinian governance. The Quartet and the 
EU pushed for reform primarily as a means to reengage Washington in the peace process 
and to remove any reason or excuse for Israel’s refusal to negotiate. Hence, the undue 
attention paid to issues such as the creation of the prime minister’s post, or the reform 
of the fiscal and security sectors, at the expense of other perhaps more crucial areas of 
reform. Moreover, the blunt approach adopted by the US to the question of reform reduced 
Palestinian incentives to pursue domestic change. The position adopted by Bush in June 
2002, when he made the removal of Arafat from office a primary goal of reform, helped 
Arafat to rehabilitate his domestic standing, to silence his critics, and enabled him to stall 
on key reforms and reverse others. The US added a further obstacle to reform by U-turning 
its position on the conduct of Palestinian elections, originally scheduled for January 2003. 
Once the US realized that Arafat would win, it worked behind the scenes to defer elections. 
Consequently the pressure on Arafat was eased and he was provided with the opportunity 
to obstruct other Palestinian actors who genuinely attempted to pursue to reform. 
Yet the fundamental flaw of a policy of conditionality whose primary objective was not that 
of promoting democracy and good governance as ends in themselves, emerged in full force 
in the post-election period. Precisely at the time when reform efforts were beginning to bear 
fruit through the first peaceful democratic transfer of power in the OTs, the international 
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community sanctioned the Hamas government and with it the entire Palestinian population. 
In January 2006 Israel stopped transferring tax revenues to the PA, in April the Quartet 
suspended aid to the PA, and the US Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act halted bank transactions 
in the OTs. In sanctioning Palestine, the international community attempted to make 
the uneasy distinction between boycotting the government, while continuing to aid the 
population. Yet this distinction poorly reflected reality. Since the eruption of the intifada, 
60% the PA’s budget has been spent on salaries, which provided for the vast majority of 
health and education services and supported 25% of the population in the economically 
free-falling OTs.47 In response to the deepening economic and humanitarian crisis in the 
OTs and the escalating intra-Palestinian chaos, the Quartet agreed in June 2006 to resume 
some aid through the Temporary International Mechanism. However, this is more likely 
to force Hamas into seeking new sources of funding and disempower the Hamas Cabinet 
and legislature, rather than to reverse the economic and humanitarian damage caused by 
Israeli and international policies. 
47 Office of the Special Envoy for Disengagement 
(2006), Periodic Report, April; United Nations (2006), 
Assessment of the Future Humanitarian Risks in the 
occupies Palestinian territory, 11 April. 
Domestic Politics and Conflict in the Cases of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon
23
53 October 2006
This chapter analyses Lebanese political dynamics within the context of the difficult 
bilateral relations with Syria and the conflict with Israel. 
The first section is dedicated to the structural dynamics of Lebanese politics, namely the 
political forms and institutions of confessionalism and the way they were re-organised 
after the civil war.
The second section aims at analysing the domestic impact of more recent political 
developments such as the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 and the violent escalation with Israel 
in the summer of 2006. 
Finally, the last section is focused on the impact of foreign influences both on domestic 
Lebanese politics and on Lebanon’s bilateral relations with Syria and Israel
The war that broke out in Lebanon in 1975 ended officially in 1990 with the implementation 
of the Taif Agreement on the initiative of the Arab League and with the consent and 
patronage of Syria and the United States (Taif being a city in Saudi Arabia in which the so-
named agreement was concluded). The partial implementation, during the post-war era, 
of the Taif Agreement within a confessional system and under the tutelage of the Baath 
regime led to a radical modification of the balance of power, distorted the functioning of 
public institutions and impeded the process of reform. Syria’s hegemony over Lebanon 
was progressively institutionalised through the ratification of legally vague texts, namely 
Chapter 4 of the Taif Agreement, the Treaty of fraternity and economic, social and cultural 
cooperation and the mutual defence agreement, the last two of which were both signed 
in 1991. Such hegemony and interests were reflected on the ground in the diplomatic 
alignment, the security dependence and the interpenetration of the socio-economic (and 
often mafia-linked) networks in both countries.
The Syrian dossier is so overwhelming in Lebanese politics that it has become in itself a 
political line of cleavage to the detriment of other political projects and ideas. In other 
words, the Lebanese political groups after the war identified and classified themselves 
according to their relationship with Syrian officials and their point of view regarding the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon (“for” or “against”) rather than according to their political 
program. With the implementation of the Taif Agreement in 1990, Syrian officials thus 
managed to turn the terms of their relationship with Lebanon into a constituent of all 
political undertakings, whether of the various opposition groups or of the government. 
The subordination of Lebanese personalities from all circles and spheres to the Syrian 
authorities also had the effect of multiplying the centres of power in Lebanon, which in 
turn transposed the rivalries between various currents within the Syrian regime onto the 
Lebanese political scene. In this respect, opposing the government in Lebanon did not 
necessarily entail being excluded from the centres of decision and power.48 
Therefore, it is difficult to label politicians as “members of the opposition” and “majority”, 
or as “opposition” and “government” or “those in power”. This also relates to the difficulty 
in distinguishing between the different political parties and currents in Lebanon, in addition 
to the very limits of the classic categorisation between left and right wing. Observation 
of the Lebanese scene reveals that no classification can account for the heterogeneous 
character of political loyalties. 
Another characteristic of Lebanese politics is that the party structure since the Taif 
Agreements is characterised by the rise of formations that were engaged in the conflict. This 
has been accomplished through the political conversion of certain militias, even though 
they have not been totally demilitarised, and through the militarisation of certain parties. 
In fact, the majority of parties operating in Lebanon since 1975 have a militia component. 
Many militias which were already functioning in a dual party/militia mode have been 
recycled. Some of them, such as Hezbollah, still maintain their military structures. Others 
have been converted into political parties with the demobilisation and the dismantling 
of their military structures, such as the parties deriving from the Maronite militia, the 
Lebanese Forces.
These new parties play different roles on the political scene, but their participation in the 
political game – “normalised” without being entirely peaceful – has introduced into the 
political exercise, be it in government, in parliament or simply in society, a kind of logic 
and method inherited from militia organisation and practice. Even if they try to limit their 
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recourse to violence and arms in solving internal political conflicts, having underwritten 
support for “civil” and non-violent methods, they still have a concept of politics that 
sees the state, national and local representative institutions, the public administration 
and public goods as “booty” which it is the party’s objective to plunder. In other words, 
superimposed on the feudal conception of the state held by the old political class which 
considers it “a closed concern”, this class of politicians has introduced a militia conception 
which considers it “spoils”. 
Undoubtedly, in parallel to these two levels of political action, two others must be 
mentioned: the state as a private “enterprise”, introduced after 1993 during management 
of the country’s reconstruction by the old Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and the state as 
a military camp, a representation strengthened when General Emile Lahoud became 
President of the Republic in 1998 and with the progressive involvement of the military and 
information services in political life. 
Another form of mobilisation and party organisation after the war sprang from the role of the 
“political movements” that already existed before 1990 and which have strengthened their 
community role since. They are built around a political figure who frequently represents a 
single community. The political currents of the old Sunni Prime Minister Rafic Hariri and 
of Maronite General Michel Aoun are examples of these. Enjoying a large capacity for 
mobilisation, they have a number of media organs behind them, have run in elections in 
many regions and are heading important parliamentary coalitions.
The practices of the Lebanese political class during the post-war era are set within the 
framework of a consociational political system based on confessional consensus, which 
was created and elaborated so to represent the complexity of the pre-existing socio-cultural 
structures. It is within this framework that the Syrian regime orchestrated the implementation 
of the Taif Agreement while laying out new rules of the political game. Since the Taif 
Agreement, the central balance of power is constitutionally attributed, in a kind of collegial 
power, to a Maronite President of the Republic, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shiite Speaker 
of the Chamber of Deputies. This “presidential troika” regime was managed in the interests 
of the Syrian regime and of the heterogeneous Lebanese political and economic elites and 
Syrian allies who came to power between 1990 and 2005 without any common political 
platform. They maintained their power and control over the political sphere by restricting 
access to political and state institutions and by setting often arbitrary rules of participation, 
in particular through electoral laws. These Lebanese elites easily entered - and still enter 
- into competition to protect positions of power that give access to benefits and allow for 
control over economic interests. For example, there are regularly disputes among the “three 
presidents” over administrative nominations. They have often resorted to Syria’s arbitration to 
set the rules of the game and settle their differences. The Syrian regime gives the veto right to 
one or the other of the three Lebanese presidents, maintaining a kind of negative equilibrium 
managed to its own advantage. This troika regime has become a custom consolidated by the 
practice of the three presidents. They have set up a system of personal negotiations outside 
the institutional framework to settle questions and matters that are a source of conflict or 
dispute among them, calling upon the ministers and MPs simply to ratify the results of their 
discussions, whether conflicting or consensual. This custom has distorted the representative 
institutions and the principle of the balance and the separation of powers. 
Apart from reforms relating to the balance of powers, other reforms that could have achieved 
structural changes in the Lebanese system remain suspended. New institutions that were 
meant to guarantee the rule of law have either been put into place but have no real or 
effective power (this is the case of the Constitutional Council and the Economic and Social 
Council) or have not been set up at all (this is the case of the High Court, the mission of 
which would be to judge the presidents and ministers, and the Senate). The establishment 
of these institutions continues to be a source of debate and dissent among the political 
powers over the sharing and influence of each within them. Reforms related to the gradual 
suppression of political confessionalism, the extension of administrative decentralisation 
and the adoption of a new electoral law have not been implemented to date. Economically, 
the ultra-liberal option chosen by the public powers, which George Corm calls “economic 
neo-Lebanonism”,49 the cost of reconstruction, the corruption and squandering have sent 
the public debt spiralling to around US$ 40 billion, which is equivalent to 180 % of the 
annual Gross Domestic Product in 2005.
The implementation of reforms remains subject to the interpretation of the political 
and administrative authorities. This gives rise to permanent bartering between political 
49 G. Corm (2003),    Le Liban contemporain. Histoire et  
société, Paris: La Découverte, p. 237.
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leaders and community representatives who assent to the sectarianism and clientelism 
in the Lebanese political system. This method of functioning, which can be described as 
“limited pluralism” or “slightly democratic neo-liberalism”, goes beyond the political and 
administrative sphere of the presidents, ministers, MPs and high officials, to encompass all 
relations between individuals and the state apparatus.
Therefore, the absence of a national project going beyond the aggregate interests of the 
governing elite and the permanent conflicts of the political class have exacerbated the 
population’s distrust of the state and its institutions. The effects of these practices are 
manifest in society in the declining role of public institutions, which are supposed to play a 
unifying role transcending structural cleavages, as well as in post-war forms of mobilisation 
which promote the consolidation of traditional structures.
An important example illustrating the difficulties in implementing reforms in the Lebanese 
confessional system under Syrian domination was the question of the presidential elections 
in September 2004 and their repercussions. 
The Lebanese-Syrian conflict, which broke out after the amendment of the Lebanese 
Constitution imposed by Syrian President Bachar al-Asad on 3 September 2004 to bring 
about a three-year extension to the mandate of the President of the Republic Emile 
Lahoud,50 sheds light on the power struggles at the regional and international levels and 
the domestic crisis of power. 
Outside Lebanon, the interests involved vary depending on the actors. In spite of the 
withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon51, Syria has sought to retain direct influence over the 
decision-making process in the country by maintaining Emile Lahoud as president of the 
republic and through the presence of Hezbollah ministers in the government. Thus, thanks 
to its strategic alliance with Iran, its involvement in the Iraq conflict and its influence in 
Lebanon, Syria continues to be able to play a role at the regional level and to face up to the 
pressures and demands of the United Nations and certain Western countries, namely the 
United States and France. The latter is boycotting the Lebanese president and hopes he will 
step down before the end of his mandate in conformity with the terms of Resolution 1559, 
thus paving the way for implementation of the other resolutions52 adopted by the Security 
Council after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on 14 February 2005. Along 
with the demands of the US and France, the resolutions could weaken the position of the 
Syrian regime not only in Lebanon, but in Iraq and Palestine and throughout the region. 
These resolutions are not formally linked and do not depend on one another. Nevertheless, 
they suggest that the Lebanon-Syria issue could provide a means for the United States 
and France to shape a common political strategy in the Middle East in spite to their strong 
divergences over Iraq.53
The demonstrations that took place in the wake of the assassination of Rafic Hariri as 
part of the Intifadat al-Istiqlal (independence uprising), in particular on 14 March 2005, 
drew one third of the Lebanese population into the streets of Beirut. With the catchwords 
“sovereignty, freedom and independence”, they were organised by various political 
“opposition” groups brought together in the so-called Liqa’ al-Bristol (Bristol Gathering). 
The demands put forward during the demonstrations concerned the setting up of an 
international commission of enquiry into the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the withdrawal of 
the Syrian army from Lebanon, the resignation of the head of the Lebanese secret services 
and of Omar Karamé’s government, and the setting of the dates for parliamentary elections 
between May and June 2005. By the end of June, all these demands had been met. 
In reaction to the “opposition” demonstrations, the so-called “loyalist” political groups, 
mainly the two Shia parties, Hezbollah and Amal, organised counter-demonstrations. Pledging 
allegiance to Syria, they denounced the meddling of the United States and France in Lebanese 
affairs and rejected the imposition of UN Resolution 1559 which calls for, among other things, 
the disarming of the militias. In parallel, they demanded the just and non-arbitrary application 
of all UN resolutions concerning the region and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Inside the country, after the parliamentary elections in summer 2005, the different political 
forces are divided into two groups regarding the presidential matter. The first, which calls 
for the resignation of the president, consists mainly of the Current for the Future of Saad 
Hariri (Sunni), the Progressive Socialist Party of Walid Jumblatt (Druze), the Lebanese 
Forces of Samir Geagea (Maronite) and the “Kornet Chehwan Gathering”, a gathering of 
Christian politicians. Their objective is to do away with the symbols of the trusteeship of 
50 The international community had expressed its 
opposition to the act on 2 Sept. with SC Resolution 
1559. 
51 The withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon 
was carried out in April 2005 conformity with UN Reso-
lution 1559.
52 These resolutions are Resolution 1595 of 7 April 
2005, establishing upon the request of the Lebanese 
government an independent international investiga-
tion commission, headed by Judge D. Mehlis ; Reso-
lution 1636 of 31 October 2005, calling for the mo-
bilisation of the International Community to help the 
Lebanese authorities shed a light on the responsibility 
for the assassination, then provide the best conditions 
for the extension of the mandate of the Mehlis Com-
mission and, finally, get Syria to cooperate with the 
Mehlis Commission; Resolution 1644 of 15 December 
2005, extending the mandate of the Investigation 
Commission until 15 June 2006 and  “underscores 
Syria’s obligation and commitment to cooperate fully 
and unconditionally with the Commission”. On 11 Janu-
ary 2006, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan named S. 
Brammertz head of the Investigation Commission and 
on 29 March 2006, the Security Council adopted a 
resolution giving K. Annan the right to enter into an 
agreement with the Lebanese government “aimed at 
establishing a tribunal of an international character 
based on the highest international standards of crimi-
nal justice” in order to hold accountable all those in-
volved in the assassination of R. Hariri. 
53 J. Bahout (2005), “Liban/Syrie : une alliance objective 
franco-américaine ?”, L’Orient Le Jour, 15 October, p. 5.
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the Baath regime in Lebanon and to re-legitimise the position of president by electing a new 
president from among their ranks. This would allow the Current for the Future to control two 
presidential posts – prime minister and president of the republic. Reaching an agreement 
regarding the identity of the candidate, however, seems to be one of their main problems.
The second group, which supports the president or at least opposes his resignation as 
long as there is no agreement on his successor, includes two Shiite political formations, 
the Hezbollah led by Hassan Nasrallah and the Amal movement headed by the Speaker 
of Parliament Nabih Berri, in addition to the Free Patriotic Movement of Maronite General 
Michel Aoun. Since the 2005 elections, the latter presents himself as the only really 
representative Maronite candidate with a large popular following in Christian circles, thanks 
to which he would be able to re-legitimise and strengthen the position. On the other hand, 
the two Shiite formations are concerned about preserving the privileges and prerogatives 
(sharing of power, access to state resources and to positions in the public administration, 
etc.) acquired by their community during the fifteen years of Syrian tutelage.
On the eve of the war waged by Israel against Lebanon, following Hezbollah’s kidnapping 
of two Tsahal soldiers on 12 July 2006, the Lebanese political class continued to be divided, 
schematically, into two groups, each divided internally by distinct priorities and personal 
interests. These two groups had already tabled discussions in early spring 2006 in the 
framework of the “Conference on national dialogue” 54 to discuss and resolve the following 
problems: the enquiry into the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri; 
relations with Syria; the application of UN resolution 1559, disarming of the militias and 
the conditions for the presidential elections. 
After a number of sessions, participants in the conference had agreed on three points. First, 
they agreed to set up an international tribunal tasked with judging the suspects issuing 
from the enquiry on the assassination of Rafic Hariri. Second, they agreed on the need 
to establish diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria and to resolve the border 
conflicts between the two countries.  Finally, they decided to disarm the Palestinian militias 
and to grant Palestinian refugees the social and economic rights of which they had been 
deprived. While the international tribunal is being set up, the other two decisions have 
remained dead letter. 
Furthermore, participants were unable to agree on either the identity of the future president 
of the republic or a strategy of national defence or the future of Hezbollah’s weapons. This 
fuelled discussions on the eve of the war on 12 July. 
The question of the strategy of national defence and Hezbollah’s weapons is the central 
problem in the national dialogue. Various requirements would have to be satisfied: 
application of the Taif agreements and UN Resolution 1559, both of which call for the 
disarming of all militias; the settling of disputes between Lebanon and Israel concerning 
the Shebaa farms which were not evacuated by the Israeli army during their withdrawal in 
May 2000, the release of Lebanese prisoners still in Israeli prisons, and the handing over of 
maps indicating the location of Israeli army land mines on southern Lebanese territory and 
Israel’s regular violation of Lebanese territory. The latter are the arguments Hezbollah uses 
to justify its retention of weapons and its resistance to the Hebrew state.  
The Shebaa farms are a regional dispute that international law seems unable to resolve. 
The Lebanese government invokes application of UN Resolution 425 which affirms 
Lebanon’s territorial integrity. But Israel considers this territory part of the Syrian Golan 
Heights occupied by its army in 1967. After the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon 
in April 2005, Lebanese authorities asked the Syrian government to confirm officially that 
the territory is Lebanese. By refusing to provide the United Nations with the necessary 
documents, Syria is trying to keep Lebanese and Syrian matters indistinct with respect to 
the conflict with Israel and to uphold the armed resistance of the Hezbollah.
When national defence was tabled during the national dialogue, Hezbollah leaders 
opposed sending the Lebanese army to the south to disarm their militias, so that the 
matters of the Shebaa farms and the Lebanese prisoners could not be settled. The risk, 
in their eyes, was that the national army would become a border guard between the 
Israeli army and “the resistance”, while the latter ensure a “balance of terror” against the 
Israeli army. This is why they defend continuing a strong and independent resistance. The 
groups in the parliamentary majority argued conversely that neither the resistance nor the 
Lebanese army have the military and technological means to stand up to Israeli power. 
54 The conference on National Dialogue started at 
the beginning of March 2006 on the initiative of the 
Speaker of the Parliament. The last session before the 
war was held on the 28 June 2006.
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They insisted that the problems with Israel must be settled through the United Nations, 
which had already made it possible, they believe, to neutralise the southern borders and 
to put in place the ceasefire signed by both countries in 1949 (regularly violated by both 
parties since the 1060s). Incapable of arriving at a common vision, the participants in the 
conference started to drag out the national dialogue sessions. They would converse by 
means of communiqués and speeches designed to agitate their partisan and confessional 
bases in an atmosphere intended to heat the general crisis.
Paradoxically, the triggering of this war, which attested to the Lebanese government’s weakness 
with respect to Hezbollah, has – now that it is over – strengthened the sovereignty of the Lebanese 
state. On the eve of the war, the Hezbollah, the last officially armed militia, constituted a kind of 
“state within the state”, controlling the south of the country and deciding unilaterally to make 
war (or peace) and trying to impose its conception of national defence strategy.
After the staggering war, triggered by surprise in response to Hezbollah’s capture of the two 
Israeli soldiers, the majority of the political class appealed to the Lebanese government 
to take on responsibility at all levels and to take up the initiative. Taking advantage of 
the rallying of different political parties and the support of all religious authorities, the 
Lebanese prime minister returned to centre stage to call for a diplomatic battle for a 
ceasefire at the Arab and international levels.  
Indeed, Fouad Siniora seized upon the “political truce” among the Lebanese political 
groups and their followers during the war. The prime minister, rather than representing 
only his political current, worked out a plan for getting out of the crisis in concert with 
the Speaker of Parliament.55 His aim was not only to put an end to the war, but above 
all to find a solution to the underlying problems that gave origin to the conflict. It should 
be underlined that his plan was approved unanimously by the Cabinet, including by the 
Hezbollah ministers. This bestowed on the prime minister an unprecedently strong and 
unified position from which to present to the international community and the Arab League 
a plan accepted and approved by all the main Lebanese political actors and representatives 
of the religious communities.56 From this position and with the support of the Arab League 
and many Western countries, the Lebanese government tried to negotiate the terms of the 
resolution being discussed in the Security Council to get France and the United States to 
review their proposals. While all political spheres saluted the efforts of the government, 
Hezbollah followed with attention the prime minister’s negotiations and engagements. 
Despite their inflexibility towards the Israeli war machine, Hezbollah’s leaders realised 
that, given the widespread destruction, they could not maintain their rigid stance at the 
domestic level insisting on their positions held prior to 12 July. They asked their ministers to 
contribute to the government’s activities and to delegate the Speaker of Parliament, Nabih 
Berri, to negotiate in their name with the various Lebanese and foreign actors. Indeed, they 
rank, at the negotiating level, just below institutions representing the state, the parliament 
and the government. This constituted something new, in that they had until that time           
always undertaken parallel routes to those of the state in their negotiations. 
When the prime minister decided on 7 August 2006 to send the Lebanese army to the south 
of the country to demonstrate the seriousness and the determination of his government to 
the international community, the Hezbollah ministers acquiesced in this decision. Despite 
the combattants’ opposition to the Israeli army, they were aware of the risks Lebanese 
society was running in terms of cohesion if the war were prolonged. For them, the time had 
come to show a certain opening towards the prime minister’s actions aimed at stopping 
the war – a time at which they could still claim to have beaten Israel to some extent and 
maintain a strong position vis-à-vis their internal detractors to negotiate their place, or 
rather their new place and new role within the state.
By reading the terms of Security Council Resolution 1701 on Lebanon adopted on 11 August 
2006,57 which calls for a “full cessation of hostilities”, it appears to involve a compromise 
that satisfies all actors concerned. In fact,  the resolution does not call for the forceful 
disarming of the Hezbollah since, in spite of the strengthening of the UNIFIL forces, their 
mandate does not allow them to use force (in conformity with Chap. 7 of the UN Charter) 
– something which to some extent reassured Hezbollah leaders. But, by reading SC 
Resolution 1701 in the light of inter-Lebanese dialogue, it can be seen that most of the 
terms go in the direction of strengthening the authority and the sovereignty of the Lebanese 
state. Paradoxically, the Lebanese government came out of the war strengthened, affirming 
its role as representative of all Lebanese and their collective interests. It showed a certain 
ability in diplomatic negotiations, succeeded in deploying its army throughout its territory 
and reaffirmed the need for the application of the Taif agreement, approved by all Lebanese, 
which calls for the disarming of all militias. 
55 The plan called for an immediate and comprehen-
sive cease-fire and a declaration of agreement on the 
following 7 points: (1) An undertaking to release the 
Lebanese and Israeli prisoners and detainees through 
the International Committee of the Red Cross; (2) The 
withdrawal of the Israeli army behind the Blue Line, 
and the return of the displaced to their villages; (3) 
A commitment from the Security Council to place the 
Shabaa Farms area and the Kfarshouba Hills under 
UN jurisdiction until border delineation and Lebanese 
sovereignty over them are fully settled. (4) The Leba-
nese government extends its authority over its terri-
tory through its own legitimate armed forces; (5) The 
UN international force, operating in South Lebanon, is 
supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, 
mandate and scope of operation, as needed, in order 
to undertake urgent humanitarian and relief work and 
guarantee stability and security in the south so that 
those who fled their homes can return; (6) The UN, in 
cooperation with the relevant parties, undertakes the 
necessary measures to once again put into effect the 
Armistice Agreement signed by Lebanon and Israel 
in 1949; (7) The international community commits to 
support Lebanon on all levels, and to assist it in fac-
ing the tremendous burden resulting from the human, 
social, and economic tragedy which has afflicted the 
country (AFP, 28/07/2006).
56 The leaders of all Lebanese religious communities 
unanimously accepted the plan on August 1, 2006.
57 The SC resolution 1701 is available at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/U NDOC/GEN/
N06/465/03/PDF/N0646503.pdf?OpenElement
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3. 
Foreign Influences 
on Lebanese, Syrian 
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Politics
There are now two series of complementary questions which cannot yet be answered. They 
concern, on the one hand, the stability of the truce and various belligerents’ respect for 
their commitments and for UN Resolution 1701. On the other hand, they regard Hezbollah’s 
strategy: will the current policy translate into a strategic change from a position of a “state 
within a state” to a direct monopolisation of the state? To real Politik? They seized the 
moment to accept, with certain reservations, the prime minister’s plan and UN Resolution 
1701; but it is still possible for them to proclaim a military “victory” and to convert that 
victory into a political gain, imposing a new and advantageous equilibrium of force on the 
powers of and the state itself.
The general policies of the international community towards Lebanon during the past 
fifteen years have changed depending on the main actors’ priorities and on the evolution 
of the international context. With the partial implementation of the Taif Agreement, the 
international community accepted Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. The international 
community’s priority was then internal stability, the unification of the country and the 
reconstruction of the state. Furthermore Syria had to be involved alongside the international 
coalition that had liberated Kuwait after it was invaded by Saddam Hussein in 1990, and 
to participate in the Madrid Conference and the following peace process. The international 
acquiescence of Syrian presence in Lebanon was thus used as a bargaining card. 
More recently, a number of regional and international events, such as the death of Hafez 
al-Asad, the deadlock of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the US occupation of Iraq 
and so on, have radically altered such priorities. 
The renewed international attention on Lebanon since 2004 has to be seen in the light of a 
diplomatic tug-of-war between the US and France on the one hand, and Syria on the other. 
The United States increased its pressure on Syria after invading Iraq, whereas France now 
opposes the regime of Bashar Al-Asad after having been Syria’s critical ally. The new factor 
in the role of the international community with regard to Lebanon is its intensity and its 
involvement in the management of even the most minute58 details of Lebanese political life.
Since September 2004, the Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions regarding 
Lebanon: two of them have a direct political dimension relating to Lebanon’s sovereignty and 
independence, namely Resolution 1559 (2/09/2004) and Resolution 1680 (17/05/2006). 
Five resolutions relate to the assassination of R. Hariri, the investigation commission and 
the bomb explosions in Lebanon.
The effects of international involvement in Lebanon since the first UN resolution in 2004 are 
mixed and somehow contradictory. 
Among the positive effects we can list:
> International pressures have contributed to initiating a debate on issues which were 
previously considered taboo, thus accelerating the pace of change
After the pullout of the Israeli army from South Lebanon in May 2000, some protesting 
voices called for the withdrawal of the Syrian army, or at least, its redeployment, while 
questioning the use of the continuing resistance led by Hezbollah. These dissident voices 
were rapidly intimidated, and even hushed up by the thundering official rhetoric, which 
labelled these issues beyond the scope of public debate and depending solely on the will 
of two governments, the Lebanese and the Syrian. However, international intervention 
through the adoption of Resolutions 1559, 1680 and 1701 abolished the taboo surrounding 
these matters, including the historical issue of the borders and diplomatic relations with 
Syria. UN intervention brought these points onto the public agenda, and called for the 
state and the various Lebanese political groups to define their positions regarding these 
essential issues pertaining to Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence. In this respect, 
one cannot but notice the effects of Resolutions 1559 and 1680 in the short term.
> International pressures have encouraged the strengthening of the role of the state
In the long term, implementation of the UN resolutions pertaining to Lebanon, especially 
1559 and 1701, could contribute to promoting the role of the state. In theory, the ultimate 
objective of these resolutions and of the international intervention as a whole is to rebuild 
Lebanon’s sovereignty on new bases revolving around the institutions that represent the 
state after achieving the withdrawal of all foreign armies and, of course, after disarming 
58 According to A. Favier, “the intensive involvement 
of the International Community in Lebanon can also 
be measured by the presence of three special UN 
envoys in charge of overseeing the developments in 
South Lebanon (G. Pedersen), the follow-up of the 
implementation of Resolution 1559 (R. Larsen) and the 
international investigation (Mehlis then Brammertz). 
These envoys come to light as full-fledged actors in 
the Lebanese political game along with the ambas-
sadors of the Western powers that are most involved 
in this dossier (the US and France)”, in A. Favier, Chro-
nique d’une impasse politique annoncée : le Liban 
après le retrait de l’armée syrienne, to be published 
on the website www.ifri.org.
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all militias. Nevertheless, this foreign will calls for greater commitment on the part of the 
international community towards rebuilding the rule of law in Lebanon, which – in the long 
term – is the sole guarantee of stability and national cohesion.
Notwithstanding these positive effects, international intervention in Lebanon has also 
generated negative effects, such as:
> International pressures have risked deepening the existing cleavages within Lebanese 
society
The conflict between the different Lebanese political factions regarding international 
involvement, particularly implementation of Resolutions 1559, 1680 and – after the Israeli 
war – 1701, has brought underlying sectarian tensions to the surface. On the one hand, 
some feel that foreign intervention – especially through the UN – will help Lebanon break 
free of foreign powers and reassert its sovereignty over its territory. On the other hand, 
some consider foreign involvement to be a form of hidden meddling in Lebanon’s internal 
affairs and a breach of Lebanon’s sovereignty. In this respect, foreign intervention may 
well fuel tensions and internal divisions by blocking the functioning of government and 
crippling state institutions. 
A major issue of contention is the question of Hezbollah’s disarmament called for by UN 
Resolutions 1559 and 1701. Disarmament of Hezbollah cannot be carried out by force and 
will not be possible without tackling the wider political problems of Lebanon’s confessional 
structure, the treatment of the Shiite community and, generally speaking, the long overdue 
political reforms. Disarming Hezbollah without solving the Shiite’s grievances would mean 
running the risk of renewed sectarian violence. 
> International pressures have polarised and exacerbated the conflict between Lebanon 
and Syria
This polarisation also applies to the conflict between Lebanon and Syria. The Syrian 
regime, completely isolated by the international community, has refused so far to meet 
the demands of the Lebanese government regarding border demarcation and establishing 
diplomatic relations. The Ba’ath regime considers these demands to be imposed by the 
international community, in particular the US and France, rather than as representing the 
will of the Lebanese people as expressed in the conference of national dialogue. Hence, 
Bashar Al-Asad will have to come to terms with the fact that his status has changed from 
being the guardian of Lebanon as recognized by the international community to being 
hounded by UN resolutions and subjected to severe international pressure. The tension 
between the two countries has reached a point where any foreign intervention is likely to 
lead to an escalation of the conflict. 
This rough outline highlights the complexity of the Lebanese situation after the withdrawal 
of Syrian troops and the recent Israeli war. The challenges that the Lebanese government 
and all political forces are called upon to meet requires a national approach to the crisis 
so that a consensual strategy can be defined involving state actors and institutions – a 
diplomatic strategy and a national defence strategy – rather than diverse approaches by 
the different political actors representing the various religious communities. The latter, with 
their perpetual divisions on all issues, speak and act over and above the state by pursuing 
parallel community diplomacy and private defence through militia forces – something 
which in the long term runs counter to their own interests. Resolution of the current crisis 
could be an opportunity for Lebanon to reinforce the role of the state and to define its role 
and place at the regional level.
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Underlying the preceding analyses of Israel, Palestine and Lebanon, what emerges 
is that more often than not the international community has exacerbated domestic 
factors fuelling conflict rather than contributing to their resolution by placating or 
positively moulding those very factors. This has occurred through two principal logics 
of intervention. 
The first is that of differentiated empowerment, manifested mainly in the cases 
of Lebanon and Palestine. In the Lebanese case, the international community has 
exacerbated intra-Lebanese polarization and division, fuelling the existing confessional 
divides through an additional Syrian-based fracture. On the one hand, Syria, despite 
the withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon, has retained a strong political influence on 
the country, maintaining Emile Lahoud as president and forging close ties with several 
Hezbollah ministers in the new Cabinet. On the other hand, the UN and in particular the 
US and France, precisely in view of their aim to eliminate Syrian influence in Lebanon 
have attempted to empower anti-Syrian domestic forces. Collectively, these opposed 
logics of differentiated empowerment have exacerbated intra-Lebanese polarization 
and fragmentation. In particular, they have given rise to two groups: one calling for 
the resignation of Syrian-backed President Lahoud, and the second supporting the 
president. This has impeded the search for unification and reconstitution of Lebanese 
politics. It has hindered the de-confessionalization of the system, in view of the fact that 
Lahoud’s supporters include the Shia and Maronite groups; and his opponents comprise 
the Sunni, Druze as well as Maronite and Christian groups. In turn, differentiated 
empowerment has also hampered the process of domestic political reform in Lebanon, 
ostensibly the aim of the West and the UN. 
Likewise in the Palestinian case, the West has pursued differentiated empowerment in 
four distinct ways. Between 1994 and 2006, it consistently sought to empower the PA 
over and above the PLO. This appeared logical in view of the aim to establish a Palestinian 
state. Yet it generated perverse effects precisely in view of the fact that such a state did 
not exist, that a conflict was still ongoing and that it was the PLO that represented and 
in theory negotiated on behalf of the Palestinians. Since 1994, the US and the EU have 
also sought to create and empower a liberal based and peace process oriented ‘civil 
society’ in the Palestinian territories. It has done so ignoring the existing civil and social 
fabric in the territories, generating further incentives for corruption, and opening up 
space for other (Islamic) charity-based organizations to fill the gap in the provision of 
demanded services. Finally, and most acutely, the West has sought to empower Fateh 
over Hamas. Prior to 2006, it did so by ignoring the non-inclusiveness of the Palestinian 
political system and placing Hamas on the list of terrorist organizations. Since 2006, the 
West and the Quartet have expressly sanctioned the Hamas government and attempted 
through various channels to re-empower Fateh. This has increased Fateh’s incentives to 
hold on to power, it has failed to induce genuine moderation and greater responsibility 
within Hamas, and has exacerbated tensions and polarization between and within the 
factions, resulting in rising violence and chaos in Palestine. 
The second logic of intervention has been that of sanctions on the one hand and 
unconditional support/acquiescence on the other. In the case of Lebanon and Palestine, 
the international community has resorted to different types of sanctions. In Lebanon, the 
US and France have boycotted Syrian-backed President Lahoud, justifying this with UNSC 
resolution 1559. In Palestine, with the exception of conditionality on the renunciation of 
terrorism, the Quartet’s sanctions on the Hamas government have been largely political 
rather than legal. For example, the insistence upon Hamas’ recognition of Israel’s ‘right 
to exist’ (according to some declarations also as a ‘Jewish state’) appears to be a highly 
stringent political condition, lacking a basis in international law. Not only has it not 
been demanded of other Palestinian actors (e.g., the PLO), but it has few precedent in 
other conflict situations. On the contrary, far more common in peace processes is the 
acceptance of the parties in conflict to negotiate with each other despite their mutual 
non-recognition. This is true of all secessionist conflicts, where neither conflict party 
recognizes the other’s legitimacy and at times even its existence. 
Instead, with regard to the Fateh-dominated PA and Israel, the international community’s 
approach has been one of conditional support in the case of the PA and acquiescence 
in the case of Israel. Between the establishment of the PA and the collapse of the Oslo 
process, the international community supported PA institutions, paying little or no 
attention to their standards of democracy or good governance. The major preoccupations 
were rather a continuation of the negotiation process and the PA’s compliance in assuring 
Israel’s security. Attention to Palestinian governance and democracy only arose after the 
Oslo process collapsed and the violent intifada erupted. 
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In the case of Israel, the international community’s international support and acquiescence 
has been far starker and more consistent. It has taken different forms at different points in 
time. During the Oslo years, it entailed remaining silent about the ongoing establishment 
of ‘facts on the ground’, which directly contradicted the pledges made in international 
negotiations and the general objective of reaching a two-state solution. Following the 
collapse of the Oslo process, rhetorical EU condemnations of Israel’s conduct increased. 
But not only did this not translate into concrete pressure to dissuade Israel from its conduct 
in the conflict, far more gravely, it often resulted in acquiescence in and effective support 
of Israel’s policies, contradicting international law. This included the Bush administration’s 
hint of its possible acceptance of Israel’s annexation of swathes of territory in the West Bank. 
It also included the EU’s failure to effectively respond to the fact that in all its contractual 
ties with Israel, the government of Israel has interpreted its territorial scope as including 
the territories occupied since 1967. In practice this has meant that EU benefits, spanning 
across the spheres of trade, research, and most recently the ENP, have been extended to 
Israeli actors and projects in the OTs, in contravention of international law. 
But perhaps the problem is not only that external actions have inadvertently fuelled the 
domestic drivers of the two conflicts. It may well be that international actors have also acted 
in pursuit of other objectives, which are not strictly speaking those of conflict resolution in 
accordance with international law, democracy and human rights standards. Other foreign 
policy objectives such as retaining and reconstituting strong transatlantic relations in the 
strategic Middle East or of securing a modicum of stability and security in the short-term 
may be as important as conflict resolution, democracy, human rights and international law 
objectives. 
This is not to say that that the two are incompatible. For example, security and conflict 
settlement do not necessarily compete with democracy. On the contrary, particularly if 
the focus is on conflict resolution over and above settlement, then democracy and good 
governance may be the sine qua non for peace. However, to the extent that EU actors may 
believe that particular manifestations of Palestinian or indeed Lebanese democracy could 
hinder a putative agreement with Israel and a strong transatlantic consensus, their policy 
goals could become competing, if not mutually exclusive. In other words, when it comes 
to the cases of Israel-Palestine and Lebanon-Syria, EU interests have not been exclusively 
related to the goal of promoting democracy, rights and law. Advancing such objectives 
certainly reflects EU interests, when these are understood as promoting a stable, peaceful 
and developed southern neighbourhood. Yet equally if not more important may be other 
interests, which are related to the transatlantic rather than the Middle Eastern agenda 
and which are not spelled out in EU declarations on the conflicts. The goal of seeking 
transatlantic understanding and cooperation on the Middle East has been, to varying 
degrees, a key preoccupation of all member states.
What are the policy implications of these conclusions? Undoubtedly far from being glamorous 
but perhaps more effective, the international community and EU actors in particular would 
be well advised to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach. This would entail most obviously refraining 
from interfering directly and politically in the internal affairs of a third state and from aiming 
to empower some domestic actors at the expense of others. At best, as in the case of the EU’s 
support for Labour Zionist groups or liberal minded and peace process-oriented Palestinian 
NGOs, direct and differentiated interference fails to alter domestic dynamics, given the 
detachment of the ‘supported groups’ from the general public. At worst, as in the case of 
the French boycott of Lahoud and the EU’s sanctioning of Hamas, differentiated support or 
punishment exacerbates polarization and entrenches division. 
This does not mean that the EU should not specify and stick to clear obligations in its 
engagement with the conflict parties. Far from it. Yet conditions and obligations should be 
universal and firmly based on international law, rather than time-contingent and politically 
driven. 
In the case of Palestine, this would entail calling upon the Hamas government (or indeed 
any state or state-like actor) to refrain from acts of violence carried out against Israeli 
civilians especially within the state of Israel. The practical abdication of illegal acts of 
political violence (not necessarily all forms of violent resistance) is far more important 
than the declaratory embracement of non-violence. It is far more important both as far as 
international law is concerned and in terms of the EU’s own legal commitments stemming 
from Hamas’ inclusion in the EU’s terrorist list. It is also of far greater relevance to Israeli 
citizens. The obligation not to engage in attacks on civilians and terrorist acts is an obligation 
grounded in international humanitarian law (Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions governing 
the laws of national liberation) as well as in the constitutive laws of the PA (which renounce 
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the use of violent resistance). Pegging this critical obligation to other obligations such 
as recognition of Israel’s right to exist, cannot but detract from its saliency, forcefulness 
and underlying logic. In addition, focusing on the obligation to refrain from violence is 
far more likely to foster intra-Palestinian national dialogue and reconciliation. It is more 
likely to induce genuine and long-lasting transformation, moderation and responsibility 
within Hamas itself, which as the prisoner’s document itself testifies, includes important 
currents advocating a reorientation of the strategy of resistance. Finally, it may well end up 
validating in a far more effective manner the political platform pursued by those Palestinian 
actors supported by the EU. 
Hamas could violate this obligation. For EU (and international) conditionality to be 
credible, this would indeed justify the sanctioning of the Hamas government, with the 
ensuing prospect of a collapsing PA. Yet if the international community decides to engage 
in principled conditionality, this is a consequence that it must be prepared to face. By 
contrast at the current juncture, the EU (and the Quartet) on the one hand have raised 
the bar unnecessarily high by calling for an all-encompassing set of conditions. Yet as the 
creation of the International Temporary Mechanism testifies, the Quartet has not been 
willing to accept the consequences of its negative conditionality, detracting critically from 
its credibility. The alternative proposed here would see an international focus on the most 
politically critical and legally justified obligation, which would entail far greater chances 
of compliance. Coupled with this, in the event of non-compliance, it would see an EU (and 
Quartet) prepared to accept the consequences of its principled conditionality, thus adding 
to the credibility and thus the likelihood of success of their policies. 
In the case of Israel, it would mean reasserting in practice and not only in words the 
primacy of international law in the conduct of EU-Israel relations. This would require 
that EU institutions publicly acknowledge that EU contractual ties with Israel are vitiated 
by the latter’s general public policy which contravenes international law in terms of 
the definition of its territory and of the conduct of its occupation. As far as trade and 
preferential treatment are concerned, this would lead to broad verifications of all Israeli 
exports to the Community or a partial suspension of the trade provisions in the association 
agreement. A principled, lawful and comprehensive solution to this problem to date has 
neither been sought nor found, and the EU has fumbled along seeking temporary and ad 
hoc solutions to ease the costs of its (and Israel’s) misconduct. The same would apply 
to other policy areas, such as research, where EU institutions would need to assure that 
Community funds are not being directed to illegal Israeli projects and entities operating 
in the OTs. Far more all-encompassing, in the functioning of the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument, operational in 2007, the Union would have to establish the 
necessary precautionary supervision and monitoring mechanisms to ensure that its funds 
are not being devoted to actions and actors violating international humanitarian law 
(e.g., construction of occupation infrastructure in the OTs). It would be grossly mistaken 
to view these measures as ‘punishments’ or ‘sanctions’. Far from constituting negative 
conditionality, these measures would represent minimalist readings of a customary norm 
of general international law, which states that the non-compliance by one party negates 
the obligation of compliance by the other.59 It would indeed entail a price to the third party, 
a price, which inevitably comes with systematic disrespect for international laws. 
Yet the Union need not stop at corrective measures. Through a more effective use of positive 
conditionality, it could deepen its relationship with Israel, yet careful to do so in a manner 
that would not accommodate illegal Israeli policies. Most of the steps envisaged in the 
EU-Israel ENP Action Plan would benefit the State of Israel and Israeli citizens, without 
extending benefits and thus supporting Israeli policies in the OTs. In the implementation 
of the Plan, the EU and Israel could pursue all measures of cooperation and integration 
that would not put Israel in the condition of violating international law (and the Community 
in the danger of acquiescing in it). Other issues, which would instead necessitate a 
comprehensive solution to Israel’s interpretation of the territoriality clause (e.g., trade 
measures), should instead be left pending.
In the case of Lebanon, the intervention of the EU and the International Community should 
refrain from promoting community or personal negotiations to the detriment of the state’s 
political institutions.. The main objective of international resolutions that were adopted by 
the UN Security Council is precisely to assert the role of the state and its sovereignty over all 
of its territory. However, this objective cannot be achieved without a national consensus.
The EU and the international community should not insist on Hezbollah’s disarmament 
without pursuing first the goal of seriously reforming the political system as a whole 
through an internal Lebanese dialogue. 
59 The principle of ‘inadimplenti non est adimplen-
dum’ has been codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties.2 Hans Born (2003) ‘ Introduction,’ 
in Alan Bryden and Philipp Fluri (eds.), Security Sector 
Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance, 
Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp., 43. 
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Weakening Shiite representatives would in the medium/long term threaten the delicate 
sectarian balance of the country, but also immediately bring to a standstill the internal 
political process. A marginalised Hezbollah would probably boycott the urgently needed 
economic and political reform, thus causing a dangerous stalemate on all fronts.
Hezbollah’s disarmament and political integration is also related to the open Israeli-
Lebanese files: prisoners, the Shebaa farms and the question of respect of Lebanese 
sovereignty. Solving these problems would be an important way to promote Hezbollah’s 
peaceful political transformation.
Moreover, the EU should ask for the establishment of a transparent and accountable 
mechanism for the management of the international reconstruction funds. This could avoid 
the corruption and clientelism of the reconstruction process of the 1990s and could also 
help reinforcing the role and legitimacy of the government.  
Finally, the intervention of the EU in favour of a just and impartial implementation of 
all international resolutions pertaining to the region would undoubtedly have positive 
repercussions on the Lebanese internal level and would confer on European mediation a 
leading role in the resolution of the bilateral conflicts.
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